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In an effort to reverse the declining number of IPOs seen 
over the past two decades, newly-appointed SEC Chairman 
Jay Clayton announced in mid-2017 that any company seeking 
to go public could now initially file its registration statement 
confidentially rather than publicly. This announcement 
effectively extended a policy that had originally only applied to 
emerging growth companies—firms with less than $1.07 
billion in revenue during their last fiscal year—to larger 
companies. Because there are advantages to confidentially 
filing a registration statement, this new policy was meant to 
encourage more large firms to go public and, as a result, 
increase the overall number of IPOs.  
This Note empirically examines the effect of this policy 
change over the course of its first year to analyze whether it has 
succeeded in effectuating more IPOs in the marketplace. The 
data suggest that this new policy has failed. And because it 
affects a relatively small number of firms, it will likely 
continue to fail to meaningfully increase the number of IPOs. 
This Note argues that in order to encourage more companies to 
go public, the SEC and Congress must stop focusing on 
changes to the process of going public and instead make being 
a public company more attractive to both smaller firms, which 
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have the potential to increase the number of IPOs, and larger 
firms, which can drastically increase the amount of overall 
public capital raised—another necessary metric in evaluating 
the success of the IPO market. 
In recent years, benefits granted to private capital markets 
have enabled them to flourish as viable alternatives to the 
public markets. This has led to greater societal inequality since 
average investors are often shut out from private investments, 
such as venture capital and private equity. Therefore, this Note 
argues that in order to save the public markets, benefits 
awarded to private capital must be reduced. In addition, this 
Note presents new proposals to further mitigate the structural 
realities that incentivize companies to remain private and, 
instead, encourage them to go public: (1) award firms that go 
public temporary exemptions from burdensome regulations 
that apply to public companies, such as the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act; and (2) offer tax credits to companies that conduct IPOs. 
Enacting such policies would help ensure more of today’s 
companies see the public markets as attractive sources of 
capital once again. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
In late December 2016, then-President-elect Donald J. 
Trump met with Wall Street lawyer Jay Clayton at Trump’s 
Mar-a-Lago resort in Palm Beach, Florida.1 Following his 
 
1 Robert Schmidt & Benjamin Bain, Trump Wants a Pro-Business SEC. 
That Has Some Investors Worried, BLOOMBERG (Feb. 23, 2017), 
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victory in the 2016 U.S. presidential election, Trump was 
searching for his nominee to head the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (“SEC”). During his meeting with 
Clayton, Trump “was fixated on the steep decline”2 of U.S. 
initial public offerings (“IPOs”) and was “going on and on 
about the . . . dearth of U.S. IPOs and how we need to change 
that.”3 A few months later, Clayton became SEC Chairman 
and began working to achieve the President’s goal of 
increasing the number of IPOs in the United States.4 In his 
first public address on July 12, 2017, Chairman Clayton spoke 
to the Economic Club of New York about the “need to increase 
the attractiveness of our public capital markets”5 and 
announced that the SEC’s confidential review of IPO 
registration statements—previously only available to 
“emerging growth companies”—was, as of two days earlier, 
open to all companies.6 Clayton elaborated that he hoped this 
change would encourage larger companies to “find the 
prospect of selling their shares in the U.S. public markets 
more attractive[.]”7  
This Note argues that the new SEC policy that allows large 
companies with annual revenues of $1.07 billion or more to 
confidentially file registration statements before publicly 
announcing their intentions to go public has not—and will 
not—achieve the Trump administration’s goal of increasing 






3 Bloomberg, Trump Wants a Pro-Business SEC to Boost IPOs, 
YOUTUBE (Feb. 23, 2017), https://www.youtube.com/ 
watch?v=gLHRS2O6W9g (on file with the Columbia Business Law Review). 
4 See infra Section II.E. 
5 Jay Clayton, SEC Chairman, Remarks at the Economic Club of New 
York, at II.B. (July 12, 2017) (transcript available at https://www.sec.gov/ 
news/speech/remarks-economic-club-new-york [https://perma.cc/QLP8-
2RUG]). 
6 See id. For a discussion of emerging growth companies, see infra 
Section II.D. 
7 Clayton, supra note 5. 
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abandoned in favor of others that can better succeed in this 
endeavor. Part II of this Note provides background 
information on capital formation, the securities laws that 
regulate issuer registration, and the confidential draft 
registration process, which was first established by the 
Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act (the “JOBS Act”) in 
2012 and was expanded by the SEC change in July 2017. Part 
III first surveys existing scholarship that suggests it is 
inconclusive whether the JOBS Act has succeeded in 
increasing the number of IPOs. Part III then discusses the 
results of the empirical study, conducted specifically for this 
Note by the author, which suggest that the new SEC policy 
announced in July 2017 has not had a noticeable effect on IPO 
activity. Part IV explains why the new SEC policy has failed 
to increase the number of IPOs, but argues that IPOs of larger 
companies are nonetheless essential to a healthy economy 
because they raise much more capital, despite having a 
marginal effect on the overall number of IPOs. Part IV then 
discusses the threat public markets face from private capital 
and argues that IPOs must prevail over such alternative 
financing options in order to promote distributional equality 
in the markets. Part V proposes new solutions that should be 
adopted to properly stimulate the U.S. public markets. These 
include eliminating benefits awarded to private capital, 
temporarily exempting new public companies from 
burdensome regulations required by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
and other public company compliance statutes, and offering 
tax credits to companies that conduct IPOs. Part V then calls 
for abandoning the confidential review process, since it has 
yet to conclusively show that it increases IPOs, in favor of 
greater disclosure. Part VI concludes. 
II. BACKGROUND ON INITIAL PUBLIC 
OFFERINGS AND SECURITIES REGULATION 
A. The Genesis of a Company: Financing Options for 
Entrepreneurs 
The paramount concern for an entrepreneur starting a new 
business venture is financing. Without access to cash, a 
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startup will almost certainly fail.8 First, entrepreneurs 
typically use personal finances and borrow money from family 
and friends to fund their businesses.9 Beyond this initial “seed 
round”10 of financing, entrepreneurs must consider more 
sophisticated sources of capital, such as debt financing—
borrowing money with an obligation to repay the debt—and 
equity financing—selling investors an ownership interest in 
the company.11  
Because debt financing is often only available to companies 
with earnings and assets, equity financing is one of the most 
popular options for new companies.12 There are three major 
sources that provide such financing: (1) “angels”—successful 
businesspeople with high net worth; (2) venture capital firms; 
and (3) private equity firms.13 However, because these 
individuals and entities take on high levels of risk in financing 
new businesses, they typically will only invest if the 
company’s predicted rates of return are high.14 As a result, 
 
8 See Richard A. Mann, Michael O’Sullivan, Larry Robbins & Barry S. 
Roberts, Starting from Scratch: A Lawyer’s Guide to Representing a Start-
Up Company, 56 ARK. L. REV. 773, 817 (2004) (“Expenses quickly add up, 
and a business that cannot manage its cash flow will not survive.”). 
9 See id. at 821. 
10 Id. at 822. 
11 See id. at 817. 
12 See id. 
13 Id. at 823–25; see also Jesse Scott, Note, The JOBS Act: Encouraging 
Capital Formation but Not IPOs, 7 J. BUS., ENTREPRENEURSHIP & L. 367, 
368 (2014). Although private equity and venture capital overlap somewhat, 
there are key differences between these two sources of funding. 
Traditionally, private equity firms invest in mature companies with 
established revenues and often seek a majority ownership stake. See 
Alejandro Cremades, Venture Capital vs. Private Equity: Understanding the 
Difference, FORBES (Feb. 14, 2019), https://www.forbes.com/sites/ 
alejandrocremades/2019/02/14/venture-capital-vs-private-equity-
understanding-the-difference [https://perma.cc/LN5R-DQV5]. On the 
contrary, venture capital firms invest at an earlier stage of the company’s 
growth and seek a smaller portion of the overall equity in order to spread 
the firm’s risk exposure. Id. Thus, venture capital is a more likely 
alternative for early-stage financing for entrepreneurs. 
14 See Dale A. Oesterle, The High Cost of IPOs Depresses Venture 
Capital in the United States, 1 ENTREPRENEURIAL BUS. L.J. 369, 369–70 
  
No. 1:305] GOING PUBLIC SECRETLY 311 
entrepreneurs often plan exit strategies from these initial 
financing arrangements, the most common of which are a 
merger, an acquisition, or an IPO.15 Such exit options—
particularly an IPO—allow early investors a greater chance of 
earning a high return on their initial investment in the 
company.16  
An IPO is defined as “[a] company’s first public sale of 
stock; the first offering of an issuer’s equity securities to the 
public through a registration statement.”17 Through an IPO, 
a company moves from being privately owned18 to being 
 
(2006) (“The willingness of venture capitalists, angels, and venture capital 
funds to place funds with portfolio companies depends on predictions of high 
rates of return for these high risk investments.”); Scott, supra note 13, at 
368 (noting that angel investors, venture capitalists, and private equity 
firms “require high rates of return for the high risk of the investment.”). 
15 See Mann et al., supra note 8, at 839; Scott, supra note 13, at 368. 
16 See Oesterle, supra note 14, at 370. In many cases, a well-thought-
out exit strategy will actually increase the likelihood of early-stage 
investment. See, e.g., J. William Callison, Venture Capital and Corporate 
Governance: Evolving the Limited Liability Company to Finance the 
Entrepreneurial Business, 26 J. CORP. L. 97, 109 (2000) (“[T]he existence of 
a clearly defined exit strategy is critical to the venture capitalist’s 
investment[.]”); see also Mann et al., supra note 8, at 839 (“Today’s 
investors, especially venture capitalists, place a premium on ventures with 
leaders who have planned for the future.”). 
17 Initial Public Offering, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014); see 
also Initial Public Offering (IPO), U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION, 
https://www.sec.gov/fast-answers/answersipohtm.html [https://perma.cc/ 
QZ4D-JDVP] (last modified May 31, 2013) (defining an IPO as “when a 
company first sells its shares to the public”). 
18 Private ownership is typically defined in the contrapositive—that is, 
any company that is not publicly traded. See, e.g., Private Company, 
INVESTOPEDIA, https://www.investopedia.com/terms/p/privatecompany.asp 
[https://perma.cc/L4JL-M6R8] (last updated Mar. 28, 2018) (“Private 
companies may issue stock and have shareholders, but their shares do not 
trade on public exchanges and are not issued through an initial public 
offering[.]”). For an early definition of a private company, see Edward 
Manson, The Evolution of the Private Company, 26 L.Q. REV. 11, 13 (1910) 
(“A small company which does not go to the public for its capital, and keeps 
its shares in a few hands.”). Because of the variety of forms business entities 
take, the difference between private and public companies is better captured 
by the distinction between “closely held” businesses, such as the close 
corporation, and “publicly held” businesses. Two defining characteristics of 
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owned, at least in part, by the public investment community.19 
As such, an IPO is commonly referred to as “going public” and 
usually means listing the company’s stock on the New York 
Stock Exchange (NYSE) or the Nasdaq—the two major stock 
markets in the United States—for the public to purchase.20  
B. Going Public: The Advantages and Disadvantages 
1. The Advantages of an IPO 
There are many advantages to executing an IPO that 
continue to make this option attractive to businesspeople 
today. An IPO provides a company with capital, which can be 
used for business expansion, operating expenses, and any 
other corporate purpose.21 An IPO also provides costless 
liquidity because, unlike shareholders in a closely held 
corporation, public company investors have access to public 
markets through which they can sell their shares at any time, 
for any purpose.22 Further, IPOs increase the valuation of a 
 
closely held businesses are: (1) they typically have few owners, most of 
whom are actively involved in managing the business; and (2) the owners 
have little or no liquidity options because there is no market for such shares. 
CHARLES R.T. O’KELLEY & ROBERT B. THOMPSON, CORPORATIONS AND OTHER 
BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS: CASES AND MATERIALS 451 (7th ed. 2014). Publicly 
held businesses have the opposite characteristics: (1) there are many 
shareholders, most of whom are not actively involved in the management of 
the firm but instead elect directors, who then delegate management 
authority to officers; and (2) shareholders have liquidity because they can 
easily sell their shares through the public markets. See id. at 219, 451. For 
further explanation of this distinction, see generally id. at 219–31, 451–54. 
19 Alan S. Gutterman, Strategic Business Planning Analysis and 
Marketing the High Technology Initial Public Offering Candidate, 6 SANTA 
CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 197, 199 (1991). 
20 O’KELLEY & THOMPSON, supra note 18, at 220. In fact, the NYSE and 
the Nasdaq are the first and second largest stock exchanges in the world, 
respectively. See The World’s Biggest Stock Exchanges, FORBES, 
https://www.forbes.com/pictures/eddk45iglh/the-worlds-biggest-stock-
exchanges [https://perma.cc/X8ZM-TJHD]. 
21 See DAVID A. WESTENBERG, INITIAL PUBLIC OFFERINGS: A PRACTICAL 
GUIDE TO GOING PUBLIC § 1:2.1 (2d ed. 2016). 
22 See supra note 18 for a discussion of how close corporations compare 
to public corporations. 
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company because illiquidity discounts are unnecessary and 
transaction costs associated with illiquidity are eliminated.23 
The elimination of transaction costs rests on the efficient 
market hypothesis.24 Because all publicly traded common 
shares have identical legal characteristics,25 ordinary 
investors need not incur costs to uncover the rights associated 
with particular shares. Thus, purchases and sales in the 
 
23 See O’KELLEY & THOMPSON, supra note 18, at 219; WESTENBERG, 
supra note 21, § 1:2.1. Ronald Coase defined transaction costs as those 
accumulated “[i]n order to carry out a market transaction,” such as costs 
necessary “to discover who it is that one wishes to deal with, to inform 
people that one wishes to deal and on what terms, to conduct negotiations 
leading up to a bargain, to draw up the contract, to undertake the inspection 
needed to make sure that the terms of the contract are being observed, and 
so on.” R. H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 15 (1960). 
However, economists debate over the precise definition of the term, leading 
to a range of definitions encompassing the spectrum from exhaustive to 
narrow. See, e.g., Pierre Schlag, The Problem of Transaction Costs, 62 S. 
CAL. L. REV. 1661, 1672–76 (1989) (listing several definitions of transaction 
costs advanced by other economists). 
24 There are three versions of this hypothesis: (1) The weak form states 
that stock prices reflect past information; (2) the semi-strong form states 
that stock prices reflect all publicly available information; and (3) the strong 
form states that stock prices reflect all information, both public and private. 
See, e.g., RICHARD A. BREALEY, STEWART C. MYERS & FRANKLIN ALLEN, 
PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE 329–36 (12th ed. 2017); RONALD J. 
GILSON & BERNARD S. BLACK, (SOME OF) THE ESSENTIALS OF FINANCE AND 
INVESTMENT 136–38 (1993). But see Sanford J. Grossman & Joseph E. 
Stiglitz, On the Impossibility of Informationally Efficient Markets, 70 AM. 
ECON. REV. 393 (1980) (rejecting the efficient market hypothesis and 
claiming that if all parties held perfect information, rather than information 
asymmetries, markets would extinguish). 
25 This is a result of statutory requirements imposed on corporations. 
See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 151(f) (2017) (“[T]he rights and obligations 
of the holders of certificates representing stock of the same class and series 
shall be identical.”). The Model Business Corporation Act takes the same 
approach. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 6.01(a) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016) (“[A]ll 
shares of a class or series must have terms, including preferences, rights, 
and limitations, that are identical with those of other shares of the same 
class or series.”); see also O’KELLEY & THOMPSON, supra note 18, at 160 
(“Corporate norms contemplate that all shares of a given class will be 
fungible[,] . . . [which] supports a uniform expectation that minimizes 
transaction costs for a purchaser and bolsters the functioning of a national 
market for shares.”). 
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securities markets stand in stark contrast with other 
transactions, such as mergers and acquisitions, which require 
substantial transaction costs before effectuating a deal.26 
Another benefit of going public is that it allows the company 
to offer public stock—which is generally more attractive than 
stock in a closely held corporation due to its liquidity—to 
employees as incentive compensation or to target companies 
as consideration in an acquisition.27 Finally, an IPO may offer 
a company enhanced prestige and credibility among 
customers, vendors, and employees.28 Recently, however, this 
appears to be less of a motivating factor; while companies of 
yesteryear viewed an IPO as the brass ring of success, some 
entrepreneurs today do not share that opinion.29 
2. The Disadvantages of an IPO 
Despite the aforementioned benefits a company may reap 
through an IPO, there are significant disadvantages as well. 
In fact, many commentators in recent years have stated that 
there are simply no advantages to going public in the current 
atmosphere.30  
 
26 See David J. Roberts, Note, Capitalizing the Target’s Transaction 
Costs in Hostile Takeovers, 73 WASH. L. REV. 489, 489 (1998) (“Even in 
smaller M&A deals, transaction fees can be substantial.”). 
27 WESTENBERG, supra note 21, § 1:2.1. 
28 Id. 
29 See, e.g., Brian Hamilton, Why Not Go Public? Here’s Why, CNBC 
(June 27, 2012), https://www.cnbc.com/id/47979116 [https://perma.cc/LZ7Y-
F63F] (“For a long time, one of the reasons for doing an IPO was that 
everybody else was doing it. It was a status symbol. . . . This generation 
seems to be more educated and thoughtful about options for accessing 
capital.”). 
30 E.g., Maureen Farrell, America’s Roster of Public Companies is 
Shrinking Before Our Eyes, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 6, 2017), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/americas-roster-of-public-companies-is-
shrinking-before-our-eyes-1483545879 (on file with the Columbia Business 
Law Review) (“There’s no great advantage of being public . . . . The dangers 
of being a public company are really evident.”) (quoting University of 
Michigan Ross School of Business professor Jerry Davis); Hamilton, supra 
note 29 (“For many private-company owners, the lure of ringing the bell on 
a stock exchange just isn’t there anymore. Why should it be? That bell is an 
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First, it is expensive.31 A company generally incurs 
between $2 million and $4 million in expenses throughout the 
IPO process, whether or not the company actually completes 
it and goes public.32 In addition to direct costs, companies that 
go public also incur additional expenses in the future as public 
companies, including those related to increased audit 
requirements, director and officer liability insurance, and 
securities counsel fees.33  
A second disadvantage—directly connected to the first—is 
that public companies must comply with many regulations 
that largely do not apply to private businesses.34 Most 
notably, the Securities Act of 1933 (the “1933 Act”),35 the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the “1934 Act”),36 the 
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act,37 the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 
2002 (“SOX”),38 and the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010 (“Dodd-
Frank”)39—as well as additional rules and interpretations 
 
expensive one.”); Howard Tullman, 6 Reasons Companies Aren’t Going 
Public, INC. (Apr. 18, 2017), https://www.inc.com/howard-tullman/6-
reasons-companies-arent-going-public.html [https://perma.cc/223L-YHWE] 
(“For real companies, there’s no reason to [conduct an] IPO. A good, solid 
and growing company doesn’t need or want the help, the heartaches, or the 
hurrahs of being public.”). 
31 WESTENBERG, supra note 21, § 1:2.2. 
32 Id. For example, the median total expenses for all U.S. IPOs in the 
first half of 2016 was $3.2 million. Id.  
33 Id. For example, a Financial Executives International survey found 
that publicly held companies paid an average of $3.3 million on audit fees 
in 2010, while privately held companies spent an average of only $222,300. 
Hamilton, supra note 29. 
34 WESTENBERG, supra note 21, § 1:2.2. 
35 Securities Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-22, 48 Stat. 74 (1933) (codified 
as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). 
36 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-291, 48 Stat. 881 
(1934) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). 
37 Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat. 
1494 (1977) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). 
38 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002) 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). 
39 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. 
L. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections 
of 12 U.S.C. and 15 U.S.C.). 
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promulgated by the SEC—impose enhanced regulatory 
requirements on public companies.40 For example, under 
section 13 of the 1934 Act, a public company must file periodic 
reports with the SEC and comply with enhanced auditing of 
financial reports.41 These additional requirements not only 
demand company time, resources, and expertise, but also 
result in substantial costs.42 
A third disadvantage of an IPO is that, because regulatory 
filings are public, a company’s competitors gain access to 
information that was previously confidential, such as 
financial statements.43 Finally, increased potential liability 
for the company is a major disadvantage of going public.44 
This liability often stems from material misstatements or 
omissions in public disclosures and can lead to time-
consuming, expensive class action and derivative lawsuits.45 
Because the stakes of shareholder litigation are high,46 “an 
 
40 See MARC I. STEINBERG, UNDERSTANDING SECURITIES LAW 149–50 (6th 
ed. 2014); WESTENBERG, supra note 21, § 1:2.2. 
41 O’KELLEY & THOMPSON, supra note 18, at 229. An exhaustive 
discussion of the various regulatory requirements to which public 
companies are subject is beyond the scope of this Note. It suffices here to 
say that the pecuniary and non-pecuniary costs of complying with such 
requirements is a disadvantage to going public for many companies. For 
more comprehensive looks at public company regulations, see ALLAN B. 
AFTERMAN, SEC REGULATION OF PUBLIC COMPANIES (1995); Wallace 
Timmeny, An Overview of the FCPA, 9 SYRACUSE J. INT’L L. & COM. 235 
(1982); Brian Kim, Recent Development, Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 40 HARV. J. 
ON LEGIS. 235 (2003); and David S. Huntington, Summary of Dodd-Frank 
Financial Regulation Legislation, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & 
FIN. REG. (July 7, 2010), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2010/07/07/ 
summary-of-dodd-frank-financial-regulation-legislation/ [https://perma.cc/ 
93HC-C6XA]. 
42 STEINBERG, supra note 40, at 150 (“The expenses of complying with 
Exchange Act [of 1934] and SOX requirements will be substantial.”); see also 
supra note 33 and accompanying text. 
43 WESTENBERG, supra note 21, § 1:2.2. 
44 See CARL W. SCHNEIDER, JOSEPH M. MANKO & ROBERT S. KANT, GOING 
PUBLIC: PRACTICE, PROCEDURE AND CONSEQUENCES 5 (1999).  
45 Id. at 5; WESTENBERG, supra note 21, § 1:2.2. 
46 See e.g., Tom Hals, Judge OKs Activision $275 Million Shareholder 
Settlement, $72 Million for Lawyers, REUTERS (May 20, 2015), 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-activision-settlement/judge-oks-
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entire industry of plaintiffs’ lawyers lies in wait for public 
companies announcing disappointing results or experiencing 
declines in stock prices.”47 Similarly, once public, the company 
may also be plagued by time-consuming and expensive SEC 
enforcement actions.48 
3. Alternatives to an IPO 
If a company opts to forego an IPO, one alternative is to 
remain private.49 “Remaining private is a perfectly rational 
and often satisfactory alternative . . . [because] private 
companies can operate with minimal oversight and maximum 
flexibility.”50 Companies choose to remain private in order to 
avoid many of the disadvantages of going public,51 such as 
disclosure requirements, mandatory corporate governance 
practices and regulatory obligations, and the loss of control 
that accompanies an IPO.52  
Private companies also may seek an acquisition as an 
alternative to an IPO. An acquisition provides investors with 
liquidity and the post-acquisition firm with additional capital 
resources and economies of scale.53 This strategy has proven 
particularly lucrative for high-profile companies in recent 
years, such as Instagram and WhatsApp, both of which opted 




47 WESTENBERG, supra note 21, § 1:2.2. 
48 See generally David Marcus & Stephen Choi, SEC Enforcement 
Actions Against Public Companies and Subsidiaries Keep Pace, HARV. L. 




49 See WESTENBERG, supra note 21, § 1:7. 
50 Id. at § 1:7.1. 
51 See supra Section II.B.2. 
52 See WESTENBERG, supra note 21, § 1:2.2. 
53 Id. at § 1:7.2. 
54 Chelsey Dulaney, Facebook Completes Acquisition of WhatsApp, 
WALL ST. J. (Oct. 6, 2014), https://www.wsj.com/articles/facebook-completes-
acquisition-of-whatsapp-1412603898 (on file with the Columbia Business 
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C. Beginning an IPO: The Registration Statement 
For companies that decide to pursue an IPO, the starting 
point of the process is the 1933 Act.55 Under section 5, a 
company making a public offering of securities must file a 
registration statement with the SEC.56 The purpose of the 
1933 Act’s registration requirement is “to assure that the 
investor has adequate information upon which to base his or 
her investment decision.”57 Although there are other forms for 
specific types of companies or unique situations, the 1933 Act 
Form S-1 remains the “basic, long-form registration 
statement,” which issuers use unless they qualify for another 
form.58  
The Form S-159 consists of two main parts: the prospectus 
and additional information not set out in the prospectus.60 
The prospectus must contain all information required by 
applicable SEC regulations, the most important of which are 
Regulation S-K, which details comprehensive disclosure 
requirements, and Regulation S-X, which lists financial 
statement requirements.61  
Material information that must be disclosed in the 
prospectus includes: (1) risk factors that make an investment 
in the company speculative; (2) a description of the principal 
 
Law Review) (discussing Facebook’s purchase of WhatsApp for $19 billion); 
Evelyn M. Rusli, Facebook Buys Instagram for $1 Billion, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 
9, 2012), https://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/04/09/facebook-buys-
instagram-for-1-billion/ [https://perma.cc/9D23-L6KR]. 
55 See Gutterman, supra note 19, at 201. 
56 Securities Act of 1933 § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 77e (2012); see also STEINBERG, 
supra note 40, at 125.  
57 THOMAS LEE HAZEN, PRINCIPLES OF SECURITIES REGULATION 52 (4th 
ed. 2017). 
58 Id. at 82. The specific requirements that must be met in order to file 
forms besides the Form S-1 are beyond the scope of this Note. 
59 For a copy of a blank Form S-1, see SEC, FORM S-1, 
https://www.sec.gov/files/forms-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/DDR3-NHTE].  
60 See WESTENBERG, supra note 21, § 13:2, at 13–3. 
61 HAZEN, supra note 57, at 81; WESTENBERG, supra note 21, § 13:2.1, at 
13–3; see also 15 U.S.C. § 77j(a). See generally SEC, supra note 59 (directing 
issuers to Regulation S-K and Regulation S-X for more information on 
specific Form S-1 requirements). 
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purposes the issuer intends to use the net proceeds from the 
offering for; (3) financial data, including income statements 
and balance sheets from prior fiscal years; (4) management’s 
discussion and analysis, known as the “MD&A,” which 
includes the company’s financial condition, liquidity, capital 
resources, and off-balance-sheet arrangements; (5) a business 
section, which details company strategy, intellectual property, 
applicable government regulations, and ongoing legal 
proceedings; and (6) executive compensation.62 This sampling 
of information provides insight into the level of disclosure 
detail that an issuer must include in the Form S-1 prospectus 
section. Over the last few decades, the length of prospectuses 
has increased considerably due to expanded disclosure 
requirements, increased investor expectations, and sensitivity 
towards potential liability.63 Part two of the Form S-1 includes 
additional information that is not included in the prospectus, 
such as the company’s offering expenses, sales of unregistered 
securities over the past three years, exhibits required by 
Regulation S-K, and financial statement schedules required 
by Regulation S-X.64  
Despite the SEC’s insistence on disclosure within Form S-
1 in order to protect potential investors, “[i]t is generally 
conceded to be a fiction that each investor or potential investor 
reads the prospectus from cover to cover.”65 Nonetheless, 
because market professionals—such as research analysts, 
brokers, and portfolio managers—as a group do read such 
publicly available information about a company,66 stock prices 
quickly reflect this information due to the “critical volume of 
 
62 See WESTENBERG, supra note 21, § 13:2.1. Although this list identifies 
six major components that must be disclosed in the prospectus, it is not 
exhaustive. For a fuller description of these components, additional 
information that must be disclosed, and optional information that is 
customary to include, see id.  
63 Id. § 13:2.2. 
64 Id. § 13:2.3. 
65 HAZEN, supra note 57, at 52. 
66 Id. 
  
320 COLUMBIA BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 2019 
trading activity” that such groups control.67 This, in turn, 
creates an efficient market through which all investors benefit 
because any relevant information disclosed in the Form S-1 is 
filtered into the market and reflected in the stock price.68 
After a Form S-1 is filed, the SEC provides comments on it 
to the issuer.69 The issuer must then respond to these 
comments and complete all other necessary steps of the IPO 
process, which are beyond the scope of this Note.70 Thus, it 
typically takes a few months after publicly filing its Form S-1 
before the firm officially becomes a public company.71 
D. The 2012 Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act  
On April 5, 2012, President Barack Obama signed the 
JOBS Act72 into law, which amended sections of the 1933 Act 
and 1934 Act by implementing several initiatives designed to 
“facilitate access to the capital markets while lessening the 
regulatory burdens of traditional IPOs[.]”73 The Act itself 
states its purpose is “[t]o increase American job creation and 
economic growth by improving access to the public capital 
markets for emerging growth companies.”74 The predicate of 
this Act was that smaller companies were deterred or 
precluded from going public because of massive regulatory 
burdens, particularly those imposed by SOX and Dodd-
Frank.75 
 
67 GILSON & BLACK, supra note 24, at 150. This idea rests of the semi-
strong form of the efficient market hypothesis. See id. at 150–51. 
68 See HAZEN, supra note 57, at 52–53. 
69 See LATHAM & WATKINS LLP, US IPO GUIDE 4–8 (2018), 
https://www.lw.com/thoughtLeadership/lw-us-ipo-guide [https://perma.cc/ 
B93H-W9KY]. 
70 See id. 
71 See id. at 4. 
72 Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, 126 Stat. 
306 (2012) (codified in various sections of 15 U.S.C.). 
73 BRENT A. OLSON, PUBLICLY TRADED CORPORATIONS HANDBOOK § 8.46, 
Westlaw (updated Oct. 2018). 
74 Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, 126 Stat. at 306. 
75 JOHN C. COFFEE, JR., HILLARY A. SALE & M. TODD HENDERSON, 
SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 146 (13th ed. 2015).  
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The new procedures codified by the JOBS Act are aimed at 
emerging growth companies (“EGCs”). An EGC is defined by 
the Act as “an issuer that had total annual gross revenues of 
less than $1,000,000,000 . . . during its most recently 
completed fiscal year.”76 This definition is adjusted for 
inflation every five years,77 and, in 2017, the SEC increased 
the EGC revenue requirement to under $1,070,000,000, which 
is where it remains today.78 In most cases, an issuer remains 
an EGC until five years after its IPO.79 
Qualifying as an EGC comes with several benefits 
throughout the registration process and beyond. First, and 
most importantly, an EGC may confidentially submit a draft 
registration statement (“DRS”), i.e. a draft Form S-1, to the 
SEC for non-public review.80 Confidential review of the Form 
S-1 is a “substantial departure” from prior rules regulating 
this process, which had never before allowed confidential 
review, but instead mandated public filing.81 Although the 
confidential filing is called a draft, it still must be 
substantially complete and include all required disclosures.82 
Further, while confidential filing is permitted initially, an 
issuer still must publicly file its registration statement no 
 
76 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(19). 
77 Id. 
78 See Inflation Adjustments and Other Technical Amendments Under 
Titles I and III of the JOBS Act, Exchange Act Release Nos. 33-10332, 34-
80355, 116 SEC Docket 1819 (Mar. 31, 2017); see also JOBS Act EGC 
Revenue Cap Raised to $1.07 Billion to Adjust for Inflation, DAVIS POLK & 
WARDWELL LLP (Apr. 3, 2017), https://www.davispolk.com/files/2017-04-
03_jobs_act_egc_revenue_cap_raised_1.07_billion_adjust_inflation.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/5H4S-GPRR]. This figure will likely continue to increase. 
See COFFEE ET AL., supra note 75, at 146 n.39. 
79 COFFEE ET AL., supra note 75, at 146. In addition to the five-year 
expiration, the Act also provides three other ways in which an issuer can 
lose EGC status. See 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(19). 
80 15 U.S.C. § 77f(e)(1). 
81 WESTENBERG, supra note 21, § 16:5.4[A]; see also infra notes 136–38 
and accompanying text.  
82 WESTENBERG, supra note 21, § 16:5.4[A]; see also supra notes 59–64 
and accompanying text for a discussion of mandatory disclosures. 
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later than fifteen days before the beginning of a road show.83 
A road show is a presentation of the issuer’s securities to 
prospective investors in order to ascertain interest in 
purchasing such securities.84 
The main advantage of confidential submission is “it 
enables an EGC to maintain its IPO plans in secrecy and delay 
disclosure of sensitive information to competitors, employees, 
and others until much later in the IPO process.”85 This also 
allows an EGC to confidentially withdraw a submitted Form 
S-1 without the public knowing, if, for example, the SEC 
raises disclosure issues that the company prefers not to 
address or market conditions take a turn for the worse.86 By 
leveraging confidential submission, an EGC thus avoids the 
public embarrassment that may result from SEC challenges 
or comments to the company’s registration statement as well 
as the stigma that is often associated with withdrawing a 
publicly filed Form S-1.87 The main disadvantage of 
confidential review is that it delays any potential benefits of 
publicly filing, such as favorable publicity or the attraction of 
potential acquirers.88 In addition, institutional investors may 
 
83 See 15 U.S.C. § 77f(e)(1). When the JOBS Act was initially passed in 
2012, issuers were required to publicly release the registration statement 
twenty-one days before a road show. See COFFEE ET AL., supra note 75, at 
146. However, this was reduced to fifteen days in late 2015 by the Highway 
Transportation Bill, also known as the FAST Act. See Changes to the JOBS 




84 See STEINBERG, supra note 40, at 142. 
85 WESTENBERG, supra note 21, § 16:5.4[C]. 
86 See id. 
87 See COFFEE ET AL., supra note 75, at 146; WESTENBERG, supra note 
21, at § 16:5.4[C]. 
88 WESTENBERG, supra note 21, § 16:5.4[C]. 
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be unwilling to partake in “test-the-waters” meetings89 until 
the Form S-1 is publicly filed.90  
In addition to the confidential filing of the Form S-1, the 
JOBS Act also grants several additional benefits to EGCs. 
These include, inter alia,91 allowing EGCs to partake in “test-
the-waters” communications with certain potential investors 
earlier than usually allowed,92 requiring only two years of 
audited financial statements rather than three,93 and 
exempting EGCs from various corporate governance 
provisions that apply to other public companies, such as “Say-
on-Pay” votes by shareholders required by Dodd-Frank.94 
However, many of these other benefits have not been widely 
utilized by eligible companies, either because the financial 
benefit is de minimis or because the market demands greater 
disclosure.95 However,, “[t]he one provision in the JOBS Act 
that has been widely adopted is confidential review.”96 
Nonetheless, although eligible companies have taken 
advantage of the confidential filing benefit, it is uncertain 
whether the JOBS Act has actually achieved its stated goal of 
increasing access to the capital markets and, in turn, 
increasing the number of IPOs.97 
 
89 A “test-the-waters” meeting allows an EGC to meet with 
institutional investors and other accredited investors before or after 
confidentially filing or publicly filing its registration statement in order to 
gauge interest in its upcoming offering. See LATHAM & WATKINS LLP, supra 
note 69, at 12; see also infra note 92 and accompanying text. 
90 WESTENBERG, supra note 21, § 16:5.4[C]. 
91 For a more comprehensive discussion of the additional benefits EGCs 
receive under the JOBS Act, see COFFEE ET AL., supra note 75, at 146–50. 
92 Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act § 105(d), 15 U.S.C. § 77e(d) 
(2012).  
93 15 U.S.C. § 77g(a)(2). 
94 Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 14A(e)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 78n-1(e)(2) 
(2012); see also COFFEE ET AL., supra note 75, at 147. 
95 See COFFEE ET AL., supra note 75, at 148–49. For example, many 
EGCs include three years of financial statements, despite the JOBS Act only 
requiring them to provide two, because the market demands this additional 
information. See id.  
96 Id. at 149.  
97 Several empirical studies have been conducted to determine the 
effect of the JOBS Act on IPO activity. See discussion infra Section III.A. 
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E. The SEC’s July 2017 Change  
On May 2, 2017, the Senate voted to confirm President 
Trump’s nominee for SEC Chairman, Jay Clayton, by a vote 
of sixty-one to thirty-seven.98 Clayton was officially sworn into 
his new position two days later on May 4, 2017.99 
Clayton’s first major policy move as Chairman came eight 
weeks later.100 On June 29, 2017, the SEC announced that it 
would begin allowing “all companies to submit draft 
registration statements relating to initial public offerings for 
review on a non-public basis.”101 Because EGCs had already 
been allowed to confidentially submit a registration statement 
under the JOBS Act,102 this policy change effectively extended 
this same privilege to non-EGCs—companies that do not 
qualify as EGCs because they had $1.07 billion or more in 
revenue during their latest fiscal year.103 Similar to the JOBS 
Act provisions, any company choosing to confidentially file its 
registration statement must still publicly file it at least fifteen 
days before a road show.104 
 
98 Geoffrey Gardner, Development Article, Expected Changes in SEC 
Regulatory Policy Under President Trump’s Administration, 36 REV. 
BANKING & FIN. L. 580, 586–87 (2017). 
99 Id. at 587. 
100 See Chad Bray & Matthew Goldstein, S.E.C. Lets All Firms Keep 




101 Press Release, SEC, SEC’s Division of Corporation Finance Expands 
Popular JOBS Act Benefit to All Companies (June 29, 2017), 
https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2017-121 [https://perma.cc/DYS5-
HJ5W]. 
102 See supra notes 72–81 and accompanying text. 
103 See supra notes 76–78 and accompanying text. 
104 Draft Registration Statement Processing Procedures Expanded, U.S. 
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 Clayton noted that his first act as Chairman was aimed at 
reversing the steep decline in the number of IPOs.105 The year 
2016 saw the fewest number of IPOs since 2009, a year 
undoubtedly reeling from the effects of the 2008 financial 
crisis.106 This change was therefore intended to make it easier 
for companies that wanted to go public to be able to do so.107 
In its press release, the SEC noted that non-public review 
would allow all companies “more flexibility to plan their 
offering[s].”108 Furthermore, Clayton argued that confidential 
filings would reduce a company’s exposure to market 
fluctuations that may harm its offering.109 This change 
(hereinafter, the “July 2017 Change” or the “Change”) took 
effect on July 10, 2017.110 
 
105 See SEC, supra 101 (quoting Clayton as saying, “We are striving for 
efficiency in our processes to encourage more companies to consider going 
public, which can result in more choices for investors, job creation, and a 
stronger U.S. economy.”); see also Update 2-SEC to Allow All Companies to 
File Secretly for IPOs, REUTERS (June 29, 2017) [hereinafter SEC to Allow], 
https://www.reuters.com/article/usa-sec-ipo/update-2-sec-to-allow-all-
companies-to-file-secretly-for-ipos-idUSL3N1JR1JA [https://perma.cc/8WP 
E-ZQEA] (“It is the first major policy announcement by new Chairman Jay 
Clayton, who has said he aimed to reverse the steep decline in IPOs and 
give individual investors more access to smaller, successful companies.”). 
106 See Roger Yu, SEC to Allow Confidential IPO Registration Filings 
for All Companies, USA TODAY (June 30, 2017), https://www.usatoday. 
com/story/money/2017/06/30/sec-allow-confidential-ipo-registration-
filings/442539001/ [https://perma.cc/52HZ-ULVA]. Prior to the financial 
collapse of 2008, the most recent year that saw an equally low number of 
IPOs was 2003, a year in which one study found there were seventy IPOs. 
See Lia Der Marderosian, 2017 IPO Report, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. 
GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (May 25, 2017), https://corpgov.law. 
harvard.edu/2017/05/25/2017-ipo-report/ [https://perma.cc/2SEX-HU6F]. 
Note that this report shows that the year 2011 had one fewer IPO than 2016, 
which differs from the Yu article’s claim that 2016 saw the fewest IPOs since 
2009. See Yu, supra. However, this is likely due to differing methodologies. 
See infra notes 141 and 147 for a full discussion of this phenomenon.  
107 See Bray & Goldstein, supra note 100. 
108 SEC, supra note 101. 
109 See Yu, supra note 106. 
110 DRS Explained, supra note 104; see also Jeff John Roberts, Today 
Is the First Day of New Stealth IPO Rules, FORTUNE (July 10, 2017), 
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III. THE EFFECT OF THE CONFIDENTIAL DRAFT 
REGISTRATION PROCESS ON IPO ACTIVITY 
The July 2017 Change extended a portion of the JOBS 
Act—the ability to file a confidential DRS—to all issuers.111 
Benefits beyond the confidential review process afforded to 
EGCs under the JOBS Act were not extended to all companies 
by the Change.112 
Because the July 2017 Change is grounded in the 
confidential review provision of the JOBS Act,113 it is first best 
to assess the success of this Act. Simply put, it is not certain 
that the JOBS Act achieved its stated goal of increasing EGC 
access to the capital markets through confidential 
registration.114 Instead, scholars recognize that the results of 
early studies regarding the success of the JOBS Act’s “goal of 
facilitating small firms’ ability to raise capital” are “mixed.”115  
Analyzing the success of the JOBS Act will place the 
confidential DRS review process into context at the time of the 
July 2017 Change and will demonstrate that the SEC under 
Chairman Clayton chose to expand a policy that had, at best, 
inconclusive results. This Part begins in Section III.A by 
assessing previous scholarship on the JOBS Act and the 
dispute over whether it succeeded in increasing access to the 




111 See supra Section II.E. 
112 SEC Staff Expands Ability to File Registration Statements on a 
Nonpublic Basis, DAVIS POLK & WARDWELL LLP (July 5, 2017) [hereinafter 
SEC Staff Expands], https://www.davispolk.com/files/2017-07-05_sec_ 
staff_expands_ability_file_registration_statements_on_nonpublic_basis.pd
f [https://perma.cc/83PY-ME3R]. 
113 See supra notes 101–03 and accompanying text. 
114 See infra Section III.A. 
115 Colleen Honigsberg, Robert J. Jackson, Jr. & Yu-Ting Forester 
Wong, Mandatory Disclosure and Individual Investors: Evidence from the 
JOBS Act, 93 WASH. U. L. REV. 293, 307 (2015). In addition to the 
confidential DRS process, this study also examined other disclosure related 
aspects of the JOBS Act. See id. at 313; see also infra note 242. 
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Change through the lens of the empirical study the author of 
this Note conducted. 
A. Previous Scholarship Analyzing the Effect of the 
JOBS Act on EGC IPO Activity 
One of the earliest studies of the JOBS Act found that “the 
JOBS Act has affected IPO volume” and in the two years 
following the enactment of the JOBS Act, IPO volume in the 
United States was fifty percent higher than the previous two 
years.116 After accounting for market conditions, this study 
found that the JOBS Act was responsible for an additional 
twenty-one IPOs per year since its passage.117 However, 
three-quarters of this increase was attributed to the 
biotechnology or pharmaceutical industries.118 The study 
acknowledges this might be a result of the JOBS Act, since the 
confidential review process is of particular benefit to 
industries that have high proprietary costs, which include the 
biotechnology and pharmaceutical industries.119 However, 
because there was a lack of IPO growth in other industries 
with presumably high proprietary costs, such as the 
technological industry, the authors admitted they “might not 
have fully accounted for the recent increase in biotech/pharma 
valuations.”120 
Around the same time, another study came to the opposite 
conclusion. In a 2015 article, Professor Carlos Berdejó 
examined IPO activity before and after the enactment of the 
JOBS Act.121 Although this study found that “there has been 
a slight increase in the number of IPOs by smaller issuers in 
the post-JOBS [Act] period,” Berdejó was hesitant to attribute 
this solely to the success of the Act because the number of 
 
116 Michael Dambra, Laura Casares Field & Matthew T. Gustafson, 
The JOBS Act and IPO Volume: Evidence that Disclosure Costs Affect the 
IPO Decision, 116 J. FIN. ECON. 121, 122 (2015). 
117 Id. 
118 Id. at 123. 
119 Id. 
120 Id. 
121 Carlos Berdejó, Going Public After the JOBS Act, 76 OHIO ST. L.J. 1 
(2015). 
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IPOs by larger issuers (to whom JOBS Act benefits, such as 
confidential filing, did not apply at the time) also increased.122 
As a result, Professor Berdejó acknowledged, “the number of 
IPOs by smaller issuers could be the result of more robust 
overall IPO and economic activity or be driven by other extra-
legal factors.”123 
In addition to analyzing the sheer volume of IPOs, Berdejó 
also examined the proportion of IPOs that came from EGCs 
and found that “there has not been a noticeable increase in 
the proportion of IPOs conducted by issuers that qualify as 
EGCs” despite the fact that ECGs were taking advantage of 
the new options granted to them by the JOBS Act, such as 
filing a confidential DRS.124 Instead, the study found that the 
proportion of IPOs from EGCs actually decreased from 87.6% 
in the pre-JOBS Act period to 84.8% in the post-JOBS Act 
period.125 This was contrary to the expected result; because of 
the benefits granted to EGCs through the JOBS Act, one 
would expect that EGCs would become a greater portion of 
overall IPO activity. From this data, the study concluded “the 
JOBS Act has not had a substantial effect in increasing the 
number of smaller issuers accessing the public capital 
markets via an IPO.”126 
A third study examined IPO activity in the year 2013, the 
first full calendar year the JOBS Act was in effect.127 This 
study found that of the 183 IPOs in 2013, 146 (79.8%) were 
conducted by EGCs.128 Nonetheless, the author concluded 
that, although 2013 saw an increase in the number of IPOs as 
 
122 Id. at 35. 
123 Id. 
124 Id. at 4–5. 
125 Id. at 36–37. Of the 178 IPOs in the pre-JOBS Act period (January 
1, 2010—March 31, 2012), 156 (87.6%) were issuers that would have 
qualified as EGCs had the JOBS Act been in place. Id. at 36 tbl.1. Of the 
270 IPOs in the post-JOB Act period under study (April 1, 2012—June 30, 
2014), 229 (84.8%) qualified as EGCs under the JOBS Act. Id. 
126 Id. at 37. 
127 Todd Blakeley Skelton, Note, 2013 JOBS Act Review & Analysis of 
Emerging Growth Company IPOs, 15 TRANSACTIONS: TENN. J. BUS. L. 455, 
490 (2014).  
128 Id. at 491. 
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compared to previous years, the data did not indicate whether 
this increase was due to the JOBS Act.129 Instead, the study 
found that several other factors could have played a 
significant role in this increase, including market factors such 
as “record high levels for the S&P 500 and Dow Jones 
Industrial Average indexes, quantitative easing and 
monetary policy decisions by the Federal Reserve and other 
central banks, investor appetite for new debt and equity 
issues,” and several other macroeconomic factors.130 
Finally, the 2017 IPO Report, published by the Harvard 
Law School Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial 
Regulation, further discusses the relationship of the JOBS Act 
to IPO activity.131 This report states that eighty-five percent 
of all IPOs since the enactment of the JOBS Act were 
conducted by EGCs.132 However, it also states that 
“[a]lthough it was intended to encourage EGCs to go public, 
the JOBS Act—combined with other regulatory and market 
changes—has made it easier for EGCs to stay private longer 
and has provided them with greater flexibility in timing their 
IPOs.”133 In other words, this suggests that the JOBS Act has 
arguably had the opposite effect of its stated goal because 
allowing EGCs to confidentially file DRSs encourages them to 
remain private for longer than they would have in the absence 
of this privilege.134  
This sampling of the literature shows that it is inconclusive 
whether the JOBS Act has succeeded in increasing access to 
the capital markets and, in turn, EGC IPOs. While some 
studies show the JOBS Act resulted in modest increases in 
 
129 Id. at 495. 
130 Id. 
131 See Marderosian, supra note 106. 
132 Id. 
133 Id. 
134 See Joseph H. Kaufman, Partner, Simpson Thacher & Bartlett LLP, 
Deregulating the Markets: The Jobs Act, Panel at the 2012 National 
Lawyers Convention, in 38 DEL. J. CORP L. 476, 494 (2013) (discussing how 
the JOBS Act confidential registration provision allows companies to “get 
ready to [conduct an IPO] but not make a decision to come out into the light 
until it looks like market conditions will be strong[.]”); see also infra notes 
168–70 and accompanying text. 
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IPO activity, others find it did not affect IPO activity at all. 
Still other reports argue that, contrary to its stated goal, the 
JOBS Act has had a negative effect on IPO activity.  
B. Empirical Study Analyzing the July 2017 Change 
Despite the uncertainty over whether the JOBS Act has 
succeeded,135 the July 2017 Change expanded the confidential 
DRS policy to all companies in an effort to do the very thing 
the JOBS Act had not conclusively done: increase IPO activity 
and access to the capital markets. 
The filing of a public registration document has been a 
foundational prerequisite for going public since the passing of 
the 1933 Act.136 Indeed, “[t]he Securities Act of 1933 was 
primarily designed to provide disclosure for the investing 
public in connection with new issues of securities.”137 Now, as 
a result of the July 2017 Change, public disclosure—a bedrock 
principle of securities regulation—must occur only fifteen 
days before an issuer’s road show.138 Such a drastic change to 
disclosure warrants analysis to understand if it justified. 
1. Methodology 
The author of this Note conducted an empirical study in 
order to evaluate the success of the July 2017 Change and to 
determine the effect, if any, it has had on the capital markets 
and IPO activity. The study examines IPO activity in the 
United States from January 1, 2015 through July 9, 2018. 
This results in a data set that captures roughly two-and-one-
half years prior to the Change (January 1, 2015–July 9, 2017), 
as well as the first year after the Change (July 10, 2017–July 
9, 2018). 
 
135 See supra Section III.A. 
136 See Securities Act of 1933 §5, 15 U.S.C. § 77e (2012) (requiring a 
registration statement be filed with the SEC before any offers to sell or buy 
a given security). 
137 Philip A. Loomis, The Federal Securities Laws, 7 GA. ST. B.J. 353, 
354 (1971). 
138 See supra notes 83–84 and accompanying text. 
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The Thomson Reuters Securities Data Company Platinum 
New Issues database (“SDC Platinum”) was used to identify 
all of the IPOs in the United States that occurred during this 
time period.139 Three phases of filtering were then deployed to 
ascertain the final set of IPOs that was analyzed. First, 
filtering options within SDC Platinum excluded limited 
partnerships, blank check companies,140 investment funds, 
real estate investment trusts (REITs), foreign issuers, rights 
issues, and unit issues.141 Second, the author manually 
 
139 Securities Data Company (SDC) Platinum New Issues, THOMSON 
REUTERS, https://www.refinitiv.com/en/products/sdc-platinum-financial-
securities [https://perma.cc/US9R-63HW] (last visited Oct. 27, 2018). 
140 A blank check company is a company that either “has no specific 
business plan or purpose or has indicated its business plan is to engage in 
a merger or acquisition with an unidentified company or companies, other 
entity, or person.” Blank Check Company, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE 
COMMISSION, https://www.sec.gov/fast-answers/answers-blankcheckhtm. 
html [https://perma.cc/G5ZN-2J5Y] (last modified Oct. 28, 2014). Generally, 
such companies are formed for the sole purpose of effectuating a merger or 
acquisition between two firms. See id. 
141 The author made these filtering choices in order use a methodology 
that conforms closely with other studies in the literature. For example, 
Professor Jay Ritter keeps one of the most comprehensive studies of IPO 
activity. See Jay R. Ritter, Initial Public Offerings: Updated Statistics, U. 
FLA. (July 11, 2018), https://site.warrington.ufl.edu/ritter/files/2018/09/ 
IPOs2017Statistics_July11_2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/UF2T-952A]. In 
Table 15, Professor Ritter records the number of IPOs per year, excluding 
special purpose acquisition companies (SPACs), closed-end funds, REITs, 
unit offers, IPOs with an offer price of less than $5.00, commercial banks 
and savings and loans, companies not promptly listed on the Amex, NYSE, 
or Nasdaq, master limited partnerships, small best efforts offers, and 
foreign companies issuing American depositary receipts. Id. at 39. Other 
studies use similar filters. See, e.g., Dambra, et al., supra note 116, at 125 
(“[W]e impose filters to exclude unit offerings, IPOs in the financial 
industries (including real estate investment trusts), IPOs with proceeds 
below $5 million, best efforts offerings, rights offerings, shell companies, 
limited partnerships, foreign offerings, and non-original IPOs (issuers 
already listed in public markets, either overseas or on US OTC exchanges, 
at the time of the IPO), and we check for mistakes in the SDC data reported 
on Jay Ritter’s website.”). Therefore, the author of this Note chose to also 
exclude certain categories of IPOs in order to ascertain a data set that 
focuses on the significant IPOs that policies—such as the JOBS Act and the 
July 2017 Change—are targeted toward. Specifically, limited partnerships, 
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filtered out any of the aforementioned categories that were not 
properly removed by SDC Platinum. The author also 
eliminated offerings that were not made to the U.S. public,142 
offerings by issuers that primarily trade on an exchange other 
than the NYSE or Nasdaq—such as over-the-counter (OTC) 
offerings or IPOs listed on smaller exchanges, such as the 
NYSE American143—and offerings of penny stocks, defined as 
IPOs with an offer price under five dollars per share.144 Third, 
while manually examining the registration documents for 
each IPO,145 the author removed any IPOs that fell into one of 
the aforementioned categories (but had not been properly 
 
blank check companies, investment funds, and REITs were excluded 
because these are not true corporations. Foreign issuers were excluded 
because this study only looks at American companies going public on 
American exchanges. Rights issues and units issues are not offerings of 
common stock and thus were also excluded. 
142 Offerings not made to the U.S. public were excluded because such 
offerings are beyond the reach of the JOBS Act and the July 2017 Change. 
143 Offerings on exchanges other than the NYSE or Nasdaq were 
excluded because such offerings make up a marginal portion of the 
American IPO market and, therefore, the focus of any action taken to 
increase IPO activity is on the NYSE and Nasdaq. Together, these two 
exchanges make up nearly 100% of the market. See Market Performance, 
NASDAQ, https://www.nasdaq.com/about/market_performance.pdf (on file 
with the Columbia Business Law Review). In addition, because the July 
2017 Change was aimed at large companies, it is highly unlikely that firms 
of this size would trade OTC or on a smaller exchange, such as the NYSE 
American. See generally NYSE American, NYSE, https://www.nyse.com/ 
markets/nyse-american [https://perma.cc/SMZ9-3FCS]. 
144 See Penny Stock Rules, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION, 
https://www.sec.gov/fast-answers/answerspennyhtm.html [https://perma.cc 
/4K4V-CFLQ]. Penny stocks were excluded because they are not the focus 
of policy changes, such as the JOBS Act or the July 2017 Change, and their 
inclusion can disrupt proper comparisons of the data year over year. For 
example, one year may have many more penny stock IPOs than another 
year. However, a year with many penny stock IPOs and few non-penny stock 
IPOs would not be seen as a success due to the low amount of capital that 
penny stocks raise and the general volatility that they historically have 
offered investors. See, e.g., Barbara Aarsteinsen, High-Risk ‘Pennies’ for the 
Bold, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 17, 1985), https://www.nytimes.com/1985/11/ 
17/business/high-risk-pennies-for-the-bold.html [https://perma.cc/LC8V-
XHEH] (discussing volatility of penny stocks). 
145 See infra text accompanying notes 148–49.  
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removed during the first two phases of filtering) or that did 
not file a Form S-1 with the SEC.146 Finally, the author also 
used SDC Platinum to pull a non-filtered set of IPOs that was 
then completely manually filtered. This served as a check on 
the SDC Platinum filtering process and resulted in the 
addition of one IPO to the data set (which had been 
erroneously excluded by SDC Platinum). This methodology 
resulted in a final data set of 364 IPOs.147 
Next, the author of this Note used the SEC’s Electronic 
Data Gathering, Analysis, and Retrieval (EDGAR) 
database148 to examine the registration documents for each 
company that went public. The author searched for each 
issuer using either the issuer’s full company name or its stock 
ticker symbol. The company’s Form S-1 was located by 
matching the filing date provided by SDC Platinum.149 The 
author then manually examined each Form S-1 to determine 
if the company registered as an EGC. Companies declare EGC 
 
146 This can happen for several reasons. Information for a few 
companies simply could not be located on EDGAR. In other cases, companies 
are able to file alternative registration documents—such as a Form 1-A—
rather than a Form S-1. The reasons for these alternative processes are 
beyond the scope of this Note. Therefore, it suffices to say here that only 
companies that had an accessible Form S-1 filed with the SEC were included 
in the data set. 
147 Because of filtering choices, other IPO studies may result in slightly 
different numbers of IPOs for a given time period. For example, Professor 
Ritter reports 115 IPOs in 2015, seventy-four IPOs in 2016, and 108 IPOs 
in 2017. Ritter, supra note 141, at 40 tbl.15. However, another report states 
there were 151 IPOs in 2015, ninety-four IPOs in 2016, and 151 IPOs in 
2017. John E. Fitzgibbon Jr., The IPO Buzz: Recovery Year in Rearview 
Mirror, IPOSCOOP.COM (Jan. 1, 2018), https://www.iposcoop.com/the-ipo-
buzz-recovery-year-in-rearview-mirror/ [https://perma.cc/NPH4-HTM2]. 
This also explains why the studies cited supra Section III.A may report 
slightly different numbers of IPOs in a given time period.  
148 EDGAR, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION, https://www.sec.gov/ 
edgar/searchedgar/companysearch.html [https://perma.cc/P6ZU-D2AG] 
(last visited Oct. 27, 2018). 
149 In some instances, the filing date provided by SDC Platinum was 
incorrect. However, this did not pose a problem because in the vast majority 
of cases, a company only files one Form S-1 and, therefore, the correct 
document was easily located within EDGAR. 
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status by noting it within their prospectus and by checking 
the relevant box on the first page of the Form S-1.150  
For EGCs, EDGAR was then further used to determine if 
the company opted to first confidentially file a DRS prior to its 
public filing of the Form S-1. Although a DRS is initially 
confidential, it—along with any correspondence between the 
issuer’s law firm and the SEC—becomes public after a 
company publicly files a Form S-1.151 Issuers that had filed a 
DRS were coded as “Yes,” meaning they utilized the 
confidential filing option granted to them by the JOBS Act. 
EGCs that filed a Form S-1 without filing a DRS at an earlier 
date were coded as “No,” meaning they did not use the 
confidential submission process. 
For any company that did not claim EGC status on its 
Form S-1, the author confirmed it was a non-EGC by 
examining the company’s financial statements within its 
prospectus and verifying the company earned revenue of $1.07 
billion or more in its most recently completed fiscal year.152 
For non-EGCs that filed their Form S-1s prior to the July 2017 
Change, this was the end of the inquiry since no confidential 
DRS process was available to these issuers. For companies 
that filed a Form S-1 after the July 2017 Change, EDGAR was 
then used to repeat the process conducted for EGCs to 
determine if these companies had filed a confidential DRS 
before filing their Form S-1. 
 
150 For many Form S-1s, particularly older ones, there is no box to check 
stating that a company is an EGC. For these companies, the author of this 
Note relied solely on the language of the prospectus. 
151 See Telis Demos, Companies Find a Faster IPO Turnaround Doesn’t 
Hurt, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 29, 2013), https://www.wsj.com/articles/companies-
find-a-faster-ipo-turnaround-doesn8217t-hurt-1380492164?mg=prod/ 
accounts-wsj (on file with the Columbia Business Law Review) (“Eventually, 
all drafts of the prospectus are revealed when the documents are publicly 
filed; correspondence with the SEC is published weeks after the offering, as 
it is with nonconfidentially filed offerings.”). 
152 A company that went public prior to April 2017 qualified as a non-
EGC if it earned revenue of $1.0 billion or more in its most recently 
completed fiscal year. For the definition of an EGC, see supra notes 76–78 
and accompanying text. A non-EGC is defined as a company that does not 
fit the definition of an EGC. 
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This methodology produced the final data set analyzed 
throughout the remainder of this Note.153 
2. Results and Analysis 
 After deploying the methodology described in Section 
III.B.1, the author of this Note then analyzed the resulting 
data set to evaluate whether the July 2017 Change is a 
worthwhile or effective SEC policy. This entailed the use of 
three distinct frameworks. Framework A, discussed in Section 
III.B.2.i, examines total IPO activity by year. Framework B, 
discussed in Section III.B.2.ii, looks at whether non-EGCs 
have used the privilege of confidential filing granted to them 
by the July 2017 Change at the same rate as EGCs. 
Framework C, discussed in Section III.B.2.iii, directly 
compares IPO activity before and after the July 2017 Change. 
i. Framework A: Total IPO Activity 
As a first method of analysis, it is helpful to compare the 
number of IPOs in 2015, 2016, 2017, and the first half of 2018. 
Although the July 2017 Change became effective on July 10, 
2017, there were no 2017 IPOs from July 1, 2017 through July 
9, 2017.154 Similarly, there were no 2018 IPOs from July 1, 
2018 through July 9, 2018. Therefore, for simplicity’s sake, the 
“pre-Change” period includes Q1 2015–Q2 2017. The “post-
Change” period includes Q3 2017–Q2 2018 even though the 
actual one-year “post-Change” period is July 10, 2017–July 9, 
2018.  
 
153 Much of the discussion supra Section III.B.2 and Part IV is 
substantially based on the data set created by the author—Patrick J. 
Gallagher, IPO Data Set (on file with the Columbia Business Law Review). 
The full data set relies solely on publicly available information and is on file 
with the Columbia Business Law Review. Others should be able to recreate 
it using the methodology detailed in Section III.B.1. In an effort to ensure 
readability and avoid excessive use of citations, the Columbia Business Law 
Review has opted not to cite to the data set each time the author refers to it, 
but only when particularly relevant. 
154 The first Q3 2017 IPO occurred on July 12, 2017, after the July 2017 
Change took effect. See Patrick J. Gallagher, IPO Data Set (on file with the 
Columbia Business Law Review). 
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The study revealed a high of 115 IPOs in 2015, a dip to just 
seventy-three IPOs in 2016, and a slight boost to 101 IPOs in 
2017. The first half of 2018 was strong, with 75 IPOs. Table 1 
summarizes these results. 
 
Table 1: EGC, Non-EGC, and Total IPOs  
(Q1 2015–Q2 2018)155 
 
The true question to answer, however, is whether the July 
2017 Change affected IPO activity in any way. The July 2017 
Change only affected non-EGCs, since EGCs were already 
afforded the confidential DRS process under the JOBS Act. 
Therefore, an increase in non-EGC IPOs following the 
enactment of the Change would provide evidence that the July 
2017 Change possibly affected IPO activity. Whether such an 
increase occurred can be evaluated in two ways: first, by 
analyzing the number of non-EGC IPOs (the volume method), 
and second, by analyzing the proportion of overall IPOs that 
come from non-EGCs (the proportion method). These two 
methods of analysis are established practices in the 
literature.156 
 
155 This table summarizes information included in the data set created 
by the author. See Patrick J. Gallagher, IPO Data Set (on file with the 
Columbia Business Law Review). 
156 See, e.g., Berdejó, supra note 121, at 33–37. 
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The volume method rests on the presumption that if the 
July 2017 Change succeeds in expanding access to the capital 
markets, there will be an increase in IPOs from non-EGCs. At 
first glance, the data suggest that this may have occurred. As 
Table 1 demonstrates, the year 2017 in total saw more non-
EGC IPOs than the previous two years—there were eleven157 
non-EGC IPOs in 2017, whereas there were only nine and 
eight non-EGC IPOs in 2016 and 2015, respectively. However, 
a closer look reveals that the majority of 2017 non-EGC IPOs 
came in Q1 and Q2—both of which saw four non-EGC IPOs. 
Therefore, these offerings came before the July 2017 Change 
was announced or enacted.  
There have been nine non-EGC IPOs following the July 
2017 Change (i.e., from Q3 2017 through Q2 2018), but only 
those IPOs in Q4 2017 or later could have been motivated by 
the Change.158 This suggests that the new SEC policy has not 
 
157 It appears that two of these companies filed as non-EGCs but may 
have been able to file as EGCs due to the new inflation-adjusted definition 
of EGC announced in April 2017. See supra notes 76–78 and accompanying 
text. Floor & Decor Holdings, Inc.’s (NYSE ticker symbol: FND) final 
amended Form S-1 reports $1,050,759,000 in revenue for fiscal year 2016, 
which is under the $1.07 billion maximum fiscal revenue required for EGC 
status. Floor & Decor Holdings, Inc., Registration Statement (Form S-1/A) 
54 (Apr. 24, 2017). However, Floor & Decor likely did not avail itself of EGC 
status because its original Form S-1 was filed in February 2017, prior to the 
EGC definition change. See FDO Holdings, Inc., Registration Statement 
(Form S-1) (Feb. 10, 2017). Similarly, PQ Group Holdings Inc’s. (NYSE 
ticker symbol: PQG) initial Form S-1 reports $1,064,177,000 in revenue for 
fiscal year 2016, also under the EGC maximum revenue requirement. PQ 
Group Holdings Inc., Registration Statement (Form S-1) 65 (June 9, 2017). 
It is a bit more uncertain why PQ Group did not avail itself of EGC status 
since its initial registration statement came after the April 2017 definition 
change announcement. Nonetheless, for purposes of this Note, the author 
has chosen to include both Floor & Decor and PQ Group as non-EGCs in 
order to be as over-inclusive as possible. Neither company identified as an 
EGC although both may have technically qualified as such given the April 
2017 EGC definition change. 
158 The issuer of the Q3 2017 non-EGC IPO first filed its Form S-1 on 
June 9, 2017. PQ Group Holdings Inc., Registration Statement (Form S-1) 
(June 9, 2017). This was twenty days before the SEC’s announcement of the 
July 2017 Change. As a result, this issuer could not have been motivated by 
the new SEC policy, but instead had already planned to go public. As such, 
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been successful in increasing the volume of IPOs. Instead, 
three non-EGC IPOs during the second half159 of 2017 is fairly 
consistent with non-EGC IPO volume during the two prior 
years; there were four non-EGC IPOs during the second half 
of 2016, and two non-EGC IPOs during the second half of 
2015. Similarly, six non-EGC IPOs during the first half of 
2018 is consistent with non-EGC IPO volume during the three 
prior years; there were eight non-EGC IPOs during the first 
half of 2017, five during the first half of 2016, and six during 
the first half of 2015.160 
Furthermore, in general, it would be highly speculative to 
conclude that there is a causal link between the non-EGC 
IPOs themselves and the July 2017 Change. Indeed, two 
pieces of evidence suggest that these IPOs may have occurred 
regardless of the Change.  
First, on a micro level, the timing of the filings of the initial 
confidential DRS documents suggests that the two Q4 2017 
issuers—National Vision Holdings, Inc. (Nasdaq ticker 
symbol: EYE) and EWT Holdings I Corp. (NYSE ticker 
symbol: AQUA)—had been considering going public for quite 
 
only eight non-EGCs have filed registration documents and completed IPOs 
since the announcement and/or enactment of the July 2017 Change. 
159 Although Table 1 is organized by quarter, the first half of any given 
year includes the sum of the data for Q1 and Q2. The second half, in turn, 
encompasses Q3 and Q4. 
160 Analyzing the data on a quarterly level reveals a similar trend. 
There were two non-EGC IPOs in Q4 2017, which is in line with Q4 in the 
two prior years; Q4 2016 had three, and Q4 2015 had two. There were two 
non-EGC IPOs in Q1 2018, which is also in line with Q1 for the three prior 
years; Q1 2017 had four, Q1 2016 had zero, and Q1 2015 had one. 
Similarly, Q2 2018 had four non-EGC IPOs, and Q2 in each of the three 
years prior saw either four or five non-EGC IPOs. Using historical data as 
a predictive indicator, one would likely conclude that two non-EGC IPOs in 
Q4 2017 and four non-EGC IPOs in Q2 2018 are consistent with the number 
of non-EGCs that should have gone public during this time period, 
regardless of the July 2017 Change. Q1 2018 is inconclusive since the three 
prior years are more erratic than other quarters. Nonetheless, the fact that 
this quarter saw two non-EGC IPOs is far from significant since the prior 
year’s Q1, before the Change, saw double this amount. This more detailed 
analysis of the data further suggests that the July 2017 Change has not yet 
influenced post-Change non-EGC IPO activity. 
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some time. National Vision filed a confidential DRS on the 
first day the Change became effective—July 10, 2017—and 
EWT Holdings filed its confidential DRS one week later, on 
July 17, 2017.161 While it is possible that one or both of these 
companies were motivated by the SEC announcement of the 
July 2017 Change on June 29, 2017, it is unlikely that these 
large private companies would decide to go public and file 
their DRSs in such a short amount of time. Instead, it is more 
likely that these companies had planned to go public prior to 
the SEC announcement and slightly delayed their filings in 
order to take advantage of the new confidential filing process.  
Therefore, it is likely that only six issuers—all of whom 
filed their DRSs in September 2017 or later and went public 
in 2018—could have been motivated by the Change. However, 
as discussed, this level of non-EGC IPO activity is largely 
consistent with non-EGC IPO activity in the years prior to the 
Change.162 Nonetheless, a strong counter argument to this 
analysis is that going public takes time and, therefore, the 
first year after the Change does not capture the majority of 
companies motivated by the Change who will eventually go 
public. Instead, their IPOs may occur long after the Change 
has been in effect for only one year. As such, additional studies 
should be conducted in the future to further assess the 
Change’s effect. 
Turning to the proportion method of analysis, the data 
show similar dismal results. This method is predicated on the 
fact that if the July 2017 Change made going public more 
appealing to non-EGCs, these firms should begin to make up 
a larger proportion of overall IPO activity. This increase has 
not happened either.  
Non-EGCs in 2017 and the first half of 2018 made up a 
slightly lower percentage of total IPOs than in 2016 and a 
higher percentage than in 2015. However, focusing on Q4 
2017—the first quarter with IPOs from non-EGCs that first 
 
161 After filing these confidential DRSs, both companies continued the 
IPO process and filed public Form S-1s; National Vision filed its on 
September 29, 2017 and EWT Holdings filed its on October 3, 2017. About 
one month after filing the Form S-1s, both companies officially went public. 
162 See supra notes 158–60 and accompanying text.  
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filed their registration documents after the July 2017 
Change163—through Q2 2018, the percentage of non-EGCs is 
much lower than most quarters from prior years. Non-EGCs 
made up single digit percentages (ranging from 6%–9%) for 
each of the relevant quarters since the Change (Q4 2017–Q2 
2018), whereas such issuers made up double-digit percentages 
(ranging from 10%–24%) for six of the ten quarters before the 
Change. 
Comparing quarters individually reveals a similar trend. 
Non-EGCs made up only 6% of overall IPO activity in Q4 
2017, whereas such issuers made up 15% in Q4 2016 and 10% 
in Q4 2015. Q1 2018 non-EGC activity (7% of overall IPOs) 
greatly underperformed as compared to Q1 2017 (24%), but 
outperformed Q1 2016 (0%) and Q1 2015 (5%). Nonetheless, 
Q2 2018 saw non-EGCs make up a lower percentage of 
quarterly IPOs (9%) than each of the three previous Q2s (12% 
in 2017, 22% in 2016, and 11% in 2015). Therefore, although 
Q4 2017–Q2 2018 saw more total IPOs than most quarters 
from years past, this is likely attributable to macroeconomic 
trends since the majority of these IPOs came from EGCs, 
which were unaffected by the July 2017 Change. 
Following from these findings, using the total IPO activity 
framework as a metric of success, the July 2017 Change has 
failed to increase IPO activity. Neither the volume nor 
proportion method shows any meaningful increase in non-
EGC IPOs since the enactment of the Change.  
ii. Framework B: Non-EGC Use of Confidential 
Filing 
Another valuable metric to analyze the success of the July 
2017 Change is non-EGC use of the confidential filing process. 
This framework compares EGC issuer filings of confidential 
DRSs—an option granted to them by the JOBS Act—to non-
EGC issuer filings of confidential DRSs, an option granted to 




163 See supra note 158 and accompanying text. 
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Table 2: EGC IPO Use of Confidential Filing Process 
(Q1 2015–Q2 2018)164 
 
As Table 2 demonstrates, the overwhelming majority of 
EGCs (ninety-five percent or more in 2015, 2016, 2017, and 
the first half of 2018) utilize the confidential DRS process 
prior to filing a Form S-1. Looking at total EGC IPOs between 
Q1 2015 and Q2 2018, only ten EGC issuers elected not to first 
file a confidential DRS (which amounts to three percent of all 
EGC IPOs during this time period) before filing their Form S-
1s. The near universal use of the confidential DRS process by 
EGCs during the years following the enactment of the JOBS 
Act suggests that it offers tremendous benefits to issuers, such 
as the ability to iron out registration statement problems with 
the SEC in private and the opportunity to not disclose 
information to competitors.165  
 
164 This table summarizes information included in the data set created 
by the author. See Patrick J. Gallagher, IPO Data Set (on file with the 
Columbia Business Law Review). 
165 See supra notes 85–87 and accompanying text; see also James 
Surowiecki, The Virtues of Twitter’s Confidential I.P.O. Filing, NEW YORKER 
(Sept. 13, 2013), https://www.newyorker.com/business/currency/the-virtu 
es-of-twitters-confidential-i-p-o-filing [https://perma.cc/X4FQ-MZHC] 
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Table 3: Non-EGC IPO Use of Confidential Filing 
Process (Q1 2015–Q2 2018)166 
 
As seen in Table 3, non-EGCs have responded similarly to 
EGCs in the wake of the July 2017 Change. There have been 
eight non-EGCs that filed registration documents and went 
public after July 10, 2017.167 All but one issuer—AXA 
 
(detailing the benefits of the confidential DRS process in the context of 
Twitter’s 2013 IPO). 
166 This table summarizes information included in the data set created 
by the author. See Patrick J. Gallagher, IPO Data Set (on file with the 
Columbia Business Law Review). 
167 See supra note 158 and accompanying text. The Q3 non-EGC IPO 
issuer, PQ Group Holdings Inc. (NYSE ticker symbol: PQG), initially filed 
its Form S-1 on June 9, 2017 and, therefore, could not have participated in 
the confidential review process as the July 2017 Change had not been 
announced or enacted yet. Nonetheless, because the company did not go 
public until after the July 2017 Change took effect (the issue date was 
September 28, 2017), the company technically could have withdrawn its 
June 9, 2017 Form S-1 and elected to confidentially file a DRS on July 10, 
2017 or after. However, this likely did not make much strategic business 
sense since—by filing the June 9, 2017 Form S-1—the information that 
would have been included in the confidential DRS was already, and would 
remain, public.  
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Equitable Holdings (NYSE ticker symbol: EQH)—have 
elected to file a confidential DRS. This suggests that the 
confidential submission process offers similar benefits to non-
EGCs and these firms will continue to use this privilege, in 
line with their EGC counterparts.  
Furthermore, the data may underestimate the number of 
non-EGCs who have confidentially filed. A major benefit of the 
confidential submission process is the fact that it allows an 
issuer to have more control over the timing of its IPO 
announcement, which scholars note is a crucial component of 
IPO success.168 Therefore, the use of this process does not 
necessarily equate with an immediate increase in capital 
markets activity. Instead, it may encourage companies to 
remain private for longer than they would have in a world 
without the confidential DRS option.169 Although some 
companies file a Form S-1 quickly after first filing a 
confidential DRS, others wait years. For example, Axsome 
Therapeutics (Nasdaq ticker symbol: AXSM) filed its 
confidential DRS on August 25, 2015 and its public Form S-1 
less than two months later, on October 13, 2015. On the other 
hand, Rhythm Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (Nasdaq ticker symbol: 
RYTM) filed its confidential DRS on October 13, 2015 and its 
public Form S-1 nearly two years later on September 5, 2017. 
Such flexibility in timing has been echoed by practitioners as 
a potential result of the July 2017 Change.170 
This reveals one of the major problems in assessing the 
success of the July 2017 Change. If the Change eventually 
leads to more IPOs—which is doubtful given the lack of 
consensus around the success of the JOBS Act in increasing 
 
168 See Honigsberg et al., supra note 115, at 306. 
169 See supra notes 131–34 and accompanying text. 
170 SEC to Allow, supra note 105 (quoting Michael Zeidel, a partner in 
the corporate finance department at Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom 
LLP, saying “If you are a billion dollar company and may go public, I don’t 
think the confidential filing is going to change your ultimate decision as to 
whether to go public or not, but it can encourage companies to move more 
quickly to start the process of filing so they are ready to access the capital 
markets at the most opportune time.”). 
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the number of IPOs—the markets may not see such an 
increase for years to come.  
In an attempt to determine if non-EGCs are, in fact, filing 
confidential DRSs but not yet filing Form S-1s, the author of 
this Note filed a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request 
with the SEC. This was necessary because a DRS filed by an 
issuer who has not yet filed a Form S-1 is, due to its 
confidential nature, not public. The author requested all DRSs 
filed by non-EGCs from July 10, 2017 through October 27, 
2018 and argued that, unlike the JOBS Act, the July 2017 
Change was not grounded in statute and, therefore, is subject 
to discovery under FOIA.171  
However, the SEC denied this FOIA request. In a letter to 
the author of this Note, the SEC stated it could “neither 
confirm nor deny the existence of any records responsive to 
[this] request.”172 It explained that, “[i]f such records were to 
exist they would be exempt from disclosure pursuant to [FOIA 
Exemption 4,] 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(4) . . . [which] protects 
confidential commercial or financial information, the release 
of which could cause substantial competitive harm to the 
submitter.”173 While it is disappointing that this FOIA 
request did not reveal the number of confidential DRSs that 
have been filed by non-EGCs since the Change, ultimately 
such information would not affect the overall conclusion of 
this study. Even if many non-EGCs have filed DRSs, this 
would not mean that the July 2017 Change is successful 
because such companies would have not yet conducted IPOs. 
The Change is meant to increase IPOs, and simply filing a 
confidential DRS does not achieve this. Instead, as previously 
 
171 This argument was based on information found in SEC Staff 
Expands, supra note 112 (“[B]ecause the [SEC’s] willingness to accept this 
new set of draft registration statements on a nonpublic basis is not 
grounded in statute, these draft registration statements are subject to 
discovery under the Freedom of Information Act by the press, competitors 
and others.”). 
172 Letter from Mark P. Siford, Counsel to the Dir./Chief FOIA Officer, 
Office of Support Operations, to Patrick Gallagher, Columbia Law Sch. 1 
(Nov. 2, 2018) (on file with the Columbia Business Law Review). 
173 Id. 
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noted, it could actually mean that such companies remain 
private for much longer.174  
iii. Framework C: IPO Activity Before and After 
the July 2017 Change 
A final method of evaluation calls for a narrowing of the 
focus in order to compare equivalent time periods before and 
after the July 2017 Change. By isolating two time periods of 
equal length, the pre-Change period can serve as a control 
group for the post-Change period. This framework examines 
the one year (365 days) prior to the enactment of the Change 
and the one year (365 days) after the enactment of the 
Change.175 Tables 4, 5, and 6 summarize the data previously 
analyzed in Section III.B.2.i and Section III.B.2.ii for these 
new time periods. 
 
Table 4: EGC, Non-EGC, and Total IPOs Before and 
After the Change176 
 
Table 5: EGC IPO Use of Confidential Filing Process 
Before and After the Change177 
 
 
174 See supra notes 168–70 and accompanying text. 
175 The 365 days prior to the Change runs from July 10, 2016 through 
July 9, 2017. The 365 days after the Change runs from July 10, 2017 
through July 9, 2018. These time periods inevitably include weekends and 
holidays when the markets are closed.  
176 This table summarizes information included in the data set created 
by the author. See Patrick J. Gallagher, IPO Data Set (on file with the 
Columbia Business Law Review). 
177 This table summarizes information included in the data set created 
by the author. See id. 
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Table 6: Non-EGC IPO Use of Confidential Filing 
Process Before and After the Change178 
 
Table 4 shows the starkest evidence that the July 2017 
Change has yet to achieve its goal of increasing the number of 
IPOs. Although the one year after the Change saw more IPOs 
(126) than the one year prior to the Change (ninety-five), this 
was a result of an increase in EGC IPOs, which were not 
affected by the Change. More surprising is the fact that non-
EGC IPOs actually decreased in the one year following the 
Change; there were twelve non-EGC IPOs in the one year 
before the Change and only nine non-EGC IPOs in the one 
year after the Change. This suggests that, even if more non-
EGCs are exploring the possibility of an IPO by filing a 
confidential DRS, any benefit to the public markets will not 
be enjoyed anytime soon. 
Table 5 shows that the vast majority of EGCs continue to 
use the confidential filing process as only a handful of EGCs 
in each time period chose not to do so. Similarly, Table 6 shows 
that non-EGCs are adopting this behavior as well. It is 
important to note that one of the non-EGCs that did not file a 
confidential DRS filed its Form S-1 prior to the Change taking 
effect and, therefore, could only have taken advantage of this 
process if it chose to withdraw its Form S-1 and file a 
confidential DRS after July 10, 2017.179 As a result, all but 
one non-EGC that first filed its registration document after 
the Change took effect used the confidential process. 
 
178 This table summarizes information included in the data set created 
by the author. See id. 
179 See supra note 167 and accompanying text. 
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3. Summary of Findings  
In its first year, the July 2017 Change failed to increase 
IPO activity. The data show that, since its enactment, there 
has not been an increase in the number of non-EGC IPOs or 
in the proportion of non-EGCs in the overall IPO market. 
Instead, although non-EGCs have begun to use the 
confidential DRS process, the volume and proportion of non-
EGC IPOs have decreased as compared to time periods prior 
to the Change.  
This study is the first attempt to analyze the effect of the 
July 2017 Change, and, therefore, only assesses the first year 
of IPO activity following its enactment. Therefore, as time 
passes and more data become available, additional studies 
should be conducted in order to analyze whether the Change 
has increased IPO activity. Nonetheless, the findings of this 
empirical study suggest that the first major policy change 
under the Trump administration’s SEC has failed and will not 
generate the increase in IPOs or access to capital markets that 
it promised.  
IV. THE INHERENT FLAWS OF THE SEC’S 
APPROACH TO INCREASING IPOS 
The discussion in Part III demonstrates that the July 2017 
Change has not succeeded in increasing the number of IPOs. 
This Part now analyzes why this is the case. First, Section 
IV.A explores why the Change is at odds with the SEC’s stated 
goal of increasing the number of IPOs, but nonetheless 
defends the need to encourage non-EGC IPOs due to the large 
amount of capital these IPOs raise. Section IV.B then 
discusses how the IPO process has been largely substituted by 
private capital, and examines why the SEC must combat this 
shift in order to promote distributional equality throughout 
society via the public markets. 
A. Capital Raised as a Complementary Metric of IPO 
Success 
The inherent problem with the SEC’s July 2017 Change is 
that the agency appears to be focused primarily on increasing 
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the number of IPOs in order to revitalize the public markets. 
For example, President Trump’s first meeting with Chairman 
Clayton stressed concern over the declining number of 
IPOs.180 Further, in announcing the Change, Chairman 
Clayton highlighted that “the reduction in the number of U.S.-
listed public companies is a serious issue for our markets and 
the country more generally.”181 His rationale for the Change 
emphasized that it would “encourage more companies to 
consider going public, which can result in more choices for 
investors, job creation, and a stronger U.S. economy.”182  
However, the July 2017 Change only affects large firms, 
and there simply are not enough that could go public to have 
a significant effect on the overall number of IPOs. It is not 
surprising that EGCs have typically accounted for eighty 
percent or more of the total IPOs in a given year.183 The vast 
majority of private companies in the United States will not 
earn $1.07 billion or more—the threshold that makes a 
company a non-EGC—in revenue in one fiscal year.184 
However, the SEC must not only focus on the volume of IPOs 
in order to assess the health of the public markets. Instead, 
 
180 See supra notes 1–3 and accompanying text. 
181 Clayton, supra note 5. 
182 SEC, supra note 101; see also SEC to Allow, supra note 105 
(“Chairman Jay Clayton . . . has said he aimed to reverse the steep decline 
in IPOs and give individual investors more access to smaller, successful 
companies.”). 
183 See Berdejó, supra note 121, at 36 tbl.1. 
184 Given the nature of private companies, access to financial data is 
inherently difficult. However, because a company that generates $1.07 
billion or more in revenue is a major entity, it is a safe assumption that the 
vast majority of private companies in the United States do not reach this 
threshold. Further, according to data from the United States Census 
Bureau, the overwhelming majority of American small businesses—
73.3%—had revenues of less than $1 million in 2016. See United State 
Census Bureau, Statistics for U.S. Employer Firms by Sector, Gender, 
Ethnicity, Race, Veteran Status, and Receipts Size of Firm for the U.S., 
States, and Top 50 MSAs: 2016 Annual Survey of Entrepreneurs, AM. FACT 
FINDER (Aug. 10, 2018), https://factfinder.census.gov/faces/tableservices/ 
jsf/pages/productview.xhtml?pid=ASE_2016_00CSA03&prodType=table 
(on file with the Columbia Business Law Review); see also infra note 188. 
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the amount of capital raised by IPOs offers another valuable 
metric to examine.  
An individual non-EGC typically raises much more capital 
in its IPO than an individual EGC. Thus, non-EGCs offer a 
valuable compliment to the public markets, even if more non-
EGC IPOs are unlikely to move the needle in terms of overall 
IPO volume, given that there are so few. Table 7 summarizes 
these data. 
 
Table 7: Capital Raised by EGC and Non-EGC IPOs  
(Q1 2015–Q2 2018)185 
 
Although 2015 saw only eight non-EGC IPOs, these issuers 
accounted for twenty-nine percent of the overall capital raised 
in 2015—$5.8 billion of the nearly $20 billion. This trend 
followed in 2016 and 2017. In 2016, the nine non-EGCs that 
went public accounted for thirty-four percent of the overall 
capital raised; in 2017, the eleven non-EGCs accounted for a 
quarter of all raised capital. The first half of 2018 is even more 
significant—thirty-seven percent of all capital raised during 
this time period comes from the six non-EGC IPOs. 
Although collectively EGCs raise more capital than non-
EGCs, non-EGCs on average raise much more in their 
individual IPOs. For example, in 2015, the eight non-EGC 
 
185 This table summarizes information included in the data set created 
by the author. See Patrick J. Gallagher, IPO Data Set (on file with the 
Columbia Business Law Review). 
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issuers raised an average of $729 million, whereas the average 
EGC IPO only raised $132 million. This means that the 
average non-EGC IPO in 2015 raised 5.5 times the amount of 
capital as an EGC IPO. Once again, this pattern continued in 
the next two years. In 2016, the average non-EGC IPO raised 
3.7 times the amount of capital as the average EGC IPO. 
Interestingly—despite the July 2017 Change—the year 2017 
saw this proportion decrease as compared to 2015 and 2016; 
the average 2017 non-EGC IPO raised $436 million, 2.7 times 
the average EGC IPO of $162 million. However, this decrease 
is largely due to Snap Inc.’s March 2017 IPO, which serves as 
an outlier for this year. Although Snap is an EGC, it raised 
more capital than any other 2017 IPO.186 The first half of 2018 
shows an even starker contrast. The six non-EGC IPOs raised 
an average of $1.06 billion, 6.6 times the average EGC IPO of 
$159 million.187 
Table 7 demonstrates the fact that the SEC’s apparent goal 
and policy choice are ultimately at odds. If the SEC wishes to 
increase the number of IPOs per year, it would be best to focus 
efforts on EGCs, as IPOs from these issuers far outnumber 
non-EGC issuers. However, if the SEC hopes to increase the 
amount of capital raised per year, it should focus on non-
EGCs. Because the July 2017 Change applies only to non-
EGCs, it will never cause a meaningful increase in the number 
of IPOs in a given year. There simply are not enough private 
 
186 In fact, Snap Inc. (NYSE ticker symbol: SNAP) raised the largest 
amount of capital out of all of the companies in the data set—$3.4 billion. 
See Patrick J. Gallagher, IPO Data Set (on file with the Columbia Business 
Law Review). Removing Snap from this calculation, the average 2017 EGC 
amount raised becomes $123 million. This results in the average non-EGC 
IPO being 3.5 times greater than the average EGC IPO (excluding Snap), 
which is in line with this metric from 2016.  
187 The IPO of AXA Equitable Holdings (NYSE ticker symbol: EQH) in 
May 2018 serves as a bit of an outlier. It alone raised $2.75 billion, almost 
double the next highest 2018 IPO, which raised $1.47 billion. Still, even 
without AXA, the average non-EGC IPO in the first half of 2018 raised $957 
million, which is more than six times the average EGC IPO. 
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companies with $1.07 billion or more in revenue that are 
likely to go public.188 
This is not to say that the SEC should not focus on policies 
that encourage non-EGCs to go public. Instead, the SEC’s 
capital markets policy should embody twin aims: 1) boost EGC 
IPOs in order to increase the number of public companies, and 
2) incentivize non-EGC IPOs in order to inject a higher 
amount of capital into the public markets. Because these two 
metrics measure different aspects of the capital markets, both 
can and should be used to stimulate complimentary facets of 
the economy and increase overall activity in the public 
markets. 
But, the ability to confidentially file a DRS is simply not 
enough of a carrot to make non-EGCs walk where the SEC 
wants them to. It may not even have been enough to make 
EGCs walk anywhere.189 Because the confidential DRS 
process has failed to conclusively generate an increase in 
IPOs, the SEC must shift its focus away from such efforts. To 
effect real change, the SEC must stop focusing on attempts to 
make the process of becoming a public company more 
appealing—which is what the confidential DRS process does 
 
188 The largest 225 private companies in the United States have 
revenues that range from $2 billion to $109.7 billion, though it is unclear 
whether this metric is based off of the company’s latest fiscal year or not. 
America’s Largest Private Companies, FORBES, https://www.forbes.com/ 
largest-private-companies/list/ [https://perma.cc/P4N6-GFDP]. However, 
many of these are entities—such as law firms—that are unlikely to go public 
anytime soon. Although there are other private companies that qualify as 
non-EGCs besides these 225, in total non-EGCs likely make up a very small 
portion of the millions of private companies. In a similar vein, The Wall 
Street Journal estimates that there are only 153 venture-backed American 
private companies valued at $1 billion or more. Scott Austin, Chris Canipe 
& Sarah Slobin, The Billion Dollar Startup Club, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 18, 
2015), https://www.wsj.com/graphics/billion-dollar-club/ (on file with the 
Columbia Business Law Review) (last updated Jan. 2019). Nonetheless, 
valuation is not solely based on past revenues, and, in fact, many of these 
entities would qualify as EGCs because their latest annual revenues were 
below $1.07 billion. See id. 
189 See the inconclusive results of the JOBS Act discussed supra Section 
III.A. 
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for EGCs and non-EGCs—and instead implement policies 
that make being a public company more attractive.  
B. Promoting Equality Via the Public Markets  
Before delving into proposals aimed at effectuating more 
IPOs,190 it is necessary to first understand why such a goal is 
important. Why does the economy need public companies? 
Why should economic policy seek to encourage firms to enter 
the public markets? In short, who cares? 
The IPO market has steadily dried up over the past two 
decades. Where, according to one study, there was an annual 
average of 310 IPOs from 1980–2000, this drastically 
decreased to an average of ninety-nine IPOs from 2001–
2012.191 One leading cause of this is that alternative sources 
of financing to the public markets have ballooned in recent 
years. In discussing the IPO decrease, a member of the SEC 
Small and Emerging Companies Advisory Committee 
highlighted the “large amounts of private capital” as a 
cause.192 Private assets under management totaled less than 
$1 trillion in 2000, but surpassed $5 trillion in 2017.193 As 
such, “many companies no longer need an IPO to raise capital” 
because there is “plenty of private cash to go around.”194 Given 
this reality, revitalizing the IPO market requires policies that 
make the public markets more attractive than easily-
accessible, abundant private capital.  
When companies look to raise capital through private 
investors, the majority of Americans are cut out of the 
 
190 See infra Part V. 
191 Xiaohui Gao, Jay R. Ritter & Zhongyan Zhu, Where Have All the 
IPOs Gone?, 48 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 1663, 1663 (2013). 
192 James A. Hutchinson, SEC Small and Emerging Companies 
Advisory Committee Meeting 122 (Feb. 15, 2017) (transcript available at 
https://www.sec.gov/info/smallbus/acsec/acsec-transcript-021517.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/6Y8J-6GXD]). 
193 Frank Partnoy, The Death of the IPO, ATLANTIC (Nov. 2018), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2018/11/private-
inequity/570808/ [https://perma.cc/NC5X-UEYA]. 
194 Id.  
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equation.195 Unlike public stock markets, private funds 
typically require exceedingly high minimum investments. 
Therefore, “[o]nly the very wealthiest can afford the big sums 
demanded for direct access to private equity funds run by 
famous names such as Blackstone, Apollo and Carlyle, which 
may require a minimum investment of $1 [million], $5 
[million] or more[.]”196 In addition to private restrictions, 
some SEC rules also aim to protect individual investors from 
risky private deals, and therefore, many times “[o]nly those 
who meet certain wealth or income standards—such as 
household income of $300,000—can participate.”197  
Nonetheless, in recent years, some changes have been 
made to make private capital more accessible to a wider range 
of investors. In changing long-standing securities laws, the 
JOBS Act created a way for individuals to invest in private 
companies through equity crowdfunding,198 a method by 
which companies can raise capital from average investors 
online, functioning in a similar way to Kickstarter 
campaigns.199 Despite this, many companies see equity 
crowdfunding as a “last resort,”200 allowing traditional private 
 
195 See id. 
196 Stephen Foley, Private Equity Begins to Entice Ordinary Investors, 
FIN. TIMES (May 26, 2015), https://www.ft.com/content/e85240c4-b150-11e4-
831b-00144feab7de [https://perma.cc/GNJ5-UH38]. 
197 See Dave Michaels, SEC Chairman Wants to Let More Main Street 
Investors in on Private Deals, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 30, 2018), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/sec-chairman-wants-to-let-more-main-street-
investors-in-on-private-deals-1535648208 (on file with the Columbia 
Business Law Review). 
198 See Michael B. Dorff, The Siren Call of Equity Crowdfunding, 39 J. 
CORP. L. 493, 503 (2014). Prior to the JOBS Act, it was illegal for a new 
business to sell equity over the Internet without registering the sale 
pursuant to the 1933 Act. See id. at 501.  
199 Howard Marks, What is Equity Crowdfunding?, FORBES (Dec. 19, 
2018), https://www.forbes.com/sites/howardmarks/2018/12/19/what-is-
equity-crowdfunding/#1e5809553b5d [https://perma.cc/R8H9-CZ5D]. For 
details on the crowdfunding provisions of the JOBS Act, see Erica Wu, Note, 
Biotech Crowdfunding: How the JOBS Act Alone Cannot Save Investors, 
2018 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 1060, 1071–73 (2018). 
200 Dinah Wisenberg Brin, Equity Crowdfunding May Be a Last Resort 
for Some Startups, Study Suggests, FORBES (June 27, 2018), 
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capital, such as private equity and venture capital—typically 
available only to the wealthy—to remain supreme. 
Furthermore, Blackstone has begun targeting investors with 
$1 million to $5 million in assets, necessarily allowing 
investments of less than $1 million.201 Of course, such 
investments are still out of reach for the majority of 
Americans. Finally, the SEC is considering revising rules that 
foreclose many individual investors that do not meet income 
or wealth requirements from investing in private deals.202  
Nonetheless, in general, when the highest-growth 
companies seek private capital as an alternative to the public 
markets, it can result in “real distributive consequences” 
between wealthy and average investors.203 Primarily because, 
“[i]f many of the economy’s greatest success stories aren’t 
included in the funds that ordinary Americans hold, only the 
wealthiest members of society will enjoy the gains, 
intensifying inequality.”204 In other words, when a company 
is funded privately, any gains are received by the private 
investors, who are typically a small group made up of the 
wealthiest in society.205 On the other hand, the public 
markets offer an opportunity for anyone to invest. Today, 





201 See Miriam Gottfried, Blackstone Targets Millionaire Next Door, 
WALL ST. J. (Oct. 15, 2017), https://www.wsj.com/articles/barbarians-open-
their-gates-as-blackstone-others-seek-retail-cash-1508068802 (on file with 
the Columbia Business Law Review). 
202 See Michaels, supra note 197. 
203 Partnoy, supra note 193. 
204 Id. 
205 One caveat is that average investors may be invested indirectly in 
private equity funds through holdings in pension funds or mutual funds. 
See Mary Hall, How to Invest in Private Equity, INVESTOPEDIA (Mar. 22, 
2018), https://www.investopedia.com/articles/mutualfund/07/private_equ 
ity.asp [https://perma.cc/C6MJ-V6CW]. Nonetheless, regulations typically 
limit the amount of such funds that can be invested in private equity and 
many may not be invested in private companies at all. See id. 
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directly or indirectly via mutual funds.206 Indeed, “the 
majority of the American middle class has invested its 
retirement savings, directly or indirectly, in the stock 
market.”207  
This is why encouraging companies to go public is vital to 
the health of the American economy. When companies list on 
a public stock exchange, rather than finance through private 
capital, society as a whole benefits more. Gains are spread 
among investors across the socioeconomic class spectrum, 
rather than enjoyed just by the wealthy. And because public 
companies must comply with disclosure requirements, public 
stock is more accurately valued than private stock in which 
company information can more easily be kept behind a veil, 
despite investor demands.208 If more companies remain 
private and therefore are not subject to public transparency 
rules, “a rising share of important American companies will 
operate in the relative comforts of opacity.”209 
The SEC must address this shift to private capital head on 
if its goal of revitalizing the IPO market is to be achieved. Not 
only must the status of being a public company seem 
attractive, it also must be more attractive than remaining 
private and obtaining capital through private funding.  
V. PROPOSALS FOR INCREASING IPO ACTIVITY 
As discussed in Parts III and IV, the July 2017 Change has 
failed—and will likely continue to fail—to generate an 
increase in the number of IPOs. However, better solutions 
exist and should be implemented in order to achieve this goal. 
In order to effectively reverse the decline in IPOs, the SEC 
 
206 See COFFEE ET AL., supra note 75, at 5. 
207 Id.  
208 See James J. Park, Reassessing the Distinction Between Corporate 
and Securities Law, 64 UCLA L. REV. 116, 120 (2017) (“With truthful 
disclosure, investors will buy the stock at a valuation that reflects the risks 
associated with the investment[.]”). 
209 Gwynn Guilford, US Startups Don’t Want to Go Public Anymore. 
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must effectuate changes that accomplish two interconnected 
goals: 1) make private markets less viable for companies 
seeking capital; and 2) make the public markets—and being a 
public company—the most attractive option. This Part 
outlines three new proposals for increasing IPO activity. It 
then calls for the abolition of the confidential DRS process for 
both EGCs and non-EGCs and a return to the principle of 
disclosure that historically has served as the foundation of the 
public markets. 
A. Eliminate Benefits Awarded to Private Capital 
Many companies forego an IPO in order to avoid new 
regulations and accompanying costs,210 instead tapping 
private capital reserves that do not trigger such regulations 
or costs. Therefore, in order to lead American companies to the 
public markets, the SEC and Congress must eliminate 
regulations that benefit private capital and cause the public 
markets—and the distributional equality they promote—to 
suffer. 
Historically, section 12(g) of the 1934 Act required 
companies to become public reporting companies—and, as 
such, publicly file regular reports—once they obtained assets 
exceeding $1 million and had 500 or more shareholders.211 
This meant that “[f]or decades . . . firms could raise only small 
amounts of money without triggering public-reporting 
requirements.”212 However, in 2012, the JOBS Act increased 
the threshold to $10 million and 2000 shareholders, or 500 
 
210 See generally supra Sections II.B.2–3. 
211 See U.S. Congress Enacts JOBS Act, Increasing 499 Investor Limit 
for Private Funds to 1,999 and Eliminating Prohibition Against General 
Solicitation in Connection with Certain Private Offerings, SIDLEY AUSTIN 
LLP (Mar. 28, 2012), https://www.sidley.com/en/insights/newsupdates/ 
2012/03/us-congress-enacts-jobs-act-increasing-499-investor-limit-for-
private-funds-to-1999-and-eliminating-prohibition-against-general-
solicitation-in-connection-with-certain-private-offerings (on file with the 
Columbia Business Law Review). 
212 Partnoy, supra note 193. 
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shareholders who are not accredited investors.213 This was a 
grave mistake because it encourages companies to consider 
obtaining greater levels of private capital without having to 
worry about making public filings. Instead, if the SEC wishes 
to revitalize the IPO market, it should work with Congress to 
reduce the threshold for when companies must comply with 
disclosure requirements. One of the main reasons that 
companies seek private capital as opposed to public is the 
ability to avoid disclosure laws.214 Therefore, the JOBS Act’s 
quadrupling of the reporting threshold—in terms of number 
of shareholders—allows companies to continue to seek 
additional private funding and avoid public disclosure. 
Instead, the reporting threshold should be returned to 500 
shareholders, or perhaps lowered even further. For example, 
if a company with 250 shareholders was required to comply 
with securities disclosure laws, such a company would likely 
consider an IPO earlier in its growth since one benefit of 
remaining private—avoiding disclosure laws—would cease to 
exist after only a few hundred investors became shareholders. 
Perhaps due to its failure in bringing new companies into 
the public markets, the SEC has instead begun to consider the 
opposite: pushing more investors to the private markets.215 
This is well-intended. Struggling with how to revitalize the 
capital markets generally, Chairman Clayton is attempting to 
provide “main street investors” with an opportunity to invest 
in companies that are currently “out of their reach” since they 
are private.216 However, this is the wrong approach and 
threatens the public markets and investors generally.  
Since the Great Depression, the mandatory disclosure 
system imposed on public companies has focused on consumer 
protection by ensuring that as much information as possible 
 
213 See Changes to Exchange Act Registration Requirements to 
Implement Title V and Title VI of the JOBS Act, SEC. & EXCHANGE 
COMMISSION (May 24, 2016), https://www.sec.gov/info/smallbus/secg/jobs-
act-section-12g-small-business-compliance-guide.htm [https://perma.cc/P2 
CW-8GZ2]. 
214 See Section II.B.2. 
215 See Michaels, supra note 197. 
216 Id. 
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comes into the light so that investors are aware of the risks in 
purchasing a given stock.217 Private securities, on the other 
hand, are “off the radar of federal regulators,” and, as such, 
“[t]here is typically less information available about the firms, 
increasing risks for investors.”218 Therefore, not only would 
new rules allowing more investors into the private securities 
markets likely result in further declines in IPOs (since there 
would be an even greater abundance of private capital), but it 
would also subject investors to investments whose risks may 
remain undisclosed, thus making the investments themselves 
exponentially more risky. 
In sum, rather than encouraging more private investment, 
the SEC and Congress should eliminate benefits that 
companies enjoy by remaining private and instead cultivate a 
system in which there is little benefit—such as from a 
disclosure standpoint—in seeking private capital rather than 
public. With little benefit to seeking private capital, 
companies would be more likely to consider an IPO. 
B. Create Meaningful Benefits for Companies that 
Elect to Go Public 
In addition to eliminating the privileged status that 
private capital holds over the public markets, the SEC and 
Congress must also effectuate policies in which companies are 
actively incentivized to go public despite benefits that private 
capital may offer. By actively eliminating deterrents that 
companies cite as reasons to not go public—namely regulatory 
compliance mandates and increased costs219—the public 
markets will become more attractive. 
This Section advocates for the SEC to explore policies that 
significantly reduce regulatory compliance requirements and 
associated costs for companies that go public—especially in a 
new public company’s early years. Doing so would allow 
companies to begin to incur these increased costs in later 
years as a public company. In fact, companies could perhaps 
 
217 See COFFEE ET AL., supra note 75, at 4–6. 
218 See Michaels, supra note 197. 
219 See supra Section II.B.2. 
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even fund these additional costs through the very capital 
raised by the IPO. By eliminating major costs associated with 
going public, at least in the early years, going public can more 
effectively compete with the private capital markets, which do 
not impose such costs due to the lack of applicable regulations 
and compliance standards.  
Specifically, there are two proposals the SEC, Congress, 
and other governmental actors should explore: (1) temporarily 
exempt companies from portions of SOX and other regulations 
applicable to public companies; and (2) offer tax credits to 
companies for going public. Each of these ideas is explored 
more below. 
1. Temporarily Exempt Companies from Portions 
of SOX and Other Regulations Applicable to 
Public Companies 
In an effort to increase IPOs, EGCs and non-EGCs should 
both be temporarily exempted from portions of SOX, Dodd-
Frank, and other public company compliance statutes that are 
particularly onerous and likely serve as deterrents to going 
public. For example, section 404(b) of SOX requires auditors 
to evaluate public companies’ internal controls, the policies 
and procedures intended to prevent errors or fraud with 
regard to financial statements.220 Over the years, certain 
companies have been exempted from this requirement—
Dodd-Frank exempted very small companies and then the 
JOBS Act exempted EGCs.221 Non-EGCs who choose to go 
public should similarly be exempt from burdensome 
requirements like this for a limited period of time as well, such 
as five years.222 
 
220 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 404(b), 15 U.S.C. § 7262(b) (2012); see 
also Michael Rapoport, Why Stop at Dodd Frank? Some Want Trump’s 
Regulatory Overhaul to Go Further, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 14, 2017), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/trump-gives-impetus-to-push-to-revamp-
sarbanes-oxley-auditor-rule-1487070001 (on file with the Columbia 
Business Law Review). 
221 See Rapoport, supra note 220. 
222 This proposed length mirrors the length of time that EGCs, once 
public, are able to continue to enjoy the benefits granted by EGC status. See 
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Increased regulations and the cost of such compliance are 
consistently cited as deterrents to going public.223 Exempting 
new public companies from such requirements would likely 
make public company status much more appealing. Such a 
policy would remove substantial compliance costs from a 
firm’s initial years as a public company and allow for an 
adjustment period before subjecting the company to new, 
stringent oversight requirements. Furthermore, rather than 
risk burdening a new public company with a massive amount 
of new expenses, such a policy would allow a company to use 
the capital raised by the IPO itself—and, hopefully, the 
growth that that capital provides—to fund these new 
compliance and regulatory expenses in the future. 
Nonetheless, removing such regulations could cultivate 
fertile ground for corporate failures akin to those in the pre-
SOX era, such as the Enron fraud.224 In fact, this proposal 
may seem to contradict this Note’s general call for greater 
disclosure.225 However, this should be of little concern for two 
reasons. First, because the regulations would eventually 
apply to new public companies, it is unlikely that massive 
problems would occur during the brief exemption period. 
Second, because investors would be on notice of this policy 
change, it could actually lead to improved valuation of stock. 
Simply put, investors comfortable with the added risk of 
regulation exemptions could invest in such companies and 
hope to earn a high return, as often happens immediately 
 
supra note 79 and accompanying text. Alternatively, non-EGCs could even 
be exempted from section 404(b) and other burdensome compliance statutes 
for less time if the SEC determined that the cost savings from a shorter 
exemption period would still properly induce non-EGCs to go public. 
223 See supra Section II.B.2. 
224 See generally BETHANY MCLEAN & PETER ELKIND, THE SMARTEST 
GUYS IN THE ROOM: THE AMAZING RISE AND SCANDALOUS FALL OF ENRON 
(2003). 
225 See infra Section V.C. In addition, at least one other study has found 
that the ability for EGC’s to avoid the requirements of section 404 of SOX 
may negatively affect markets. See Honigsberg et al., supra note 115, at 309, 
313. 
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after an IPO.226 Investors that do not want to take such a risk 
could instead decide to only invest in such companies after the 
regulatory exemption period ends. If the number of risk-
averse investors is too significant, this could backfire by 
greatly reducing the demand for an issuer’s stock, thus 
indirectly making the public markets less attractive. 
However, companies could always decide to not take 
advantage of such an exemption period and instead 
voluntarily subject themselves to such requirements. It is 
common for firms to forego benefits based on market demand. 
For example, although EGCs are only required by law to 
provide two years of audited financial statements in their 
Form S-1s, most provide more due to market demands.227 
Thus, the worst-case scenario may involve some companies 
returning to the current status quo. 
This idea does not have to stop at SOX and Dodd-Frank. In 
order to be most effective, the SEC and Congress should 
identify the top regulations across all applicable statutes that 
deter companies from going public and grant a temporary 
exemption to any firm that opts to conduct an IPO.  
2. Offer Tax Incentives to Companies for Going 
Public 
Tax policy should also be used to catalyze IPOs. “Almost 
all taxes . . . change the incentives to engage in various 
activities[.]”228 Consequently, Congress should enact tax 
legislation, such as an IPO tax credit, to encourage companies 
to go public. Tax credits are currently used for a wide range of 
activities, which are often motivated, in part, by incentivizing 
businesses to act in a certain way. For example, the solar 
 
226 See e.g., infra notes 239–46 and accompanying text (discussing the 
phenomenon of underpricing). 
227 See supra note 95 and accompanying text. 
228 MICHAEL J. GRAETZ & DEBORAH H. SCHENK, FEDERAL INCOME 
TAXATION: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 28 (7th ed. 2013). 
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investment tax credit incentivizes commercial installation of 
solar and other renewable energy systems.229  
Similar tax credits could be offered to companies that 
commit to conducting an IPO. Although this would initially 
have a negative effect on the federal fisc—since the 
government’s tax revenue would presumably be less than it 
would be without the tax credit—such a policy can be justified 
for two reasons. First, encouraging more public companies 
may ultimately result in increased tax revenue in the long 
run. Any increased earnings a firm generates as a public 
entity would be taxed as additional corporate income.230 
Furthermore, investors in public common stock would 
ultimately be taxed on capital gains upon their sale of such 
stock.231 Finally, public companies would have an increased 
demand for professional services, such as law and accounting, 
which would also lead to increased tax revenue as these firms 
earn additional income servicing new public companies. As 
such, tax credits offered to encourage companies to go public 
may ultimately pay off.  
Second, even if such a tax policy did not pay for itself in the 
long run, the government should subsidize the costs of going 
public because of the equality ends it achieves.232 A public 
company avails itself of a wide range of American investors, 
unlike private capital, which often only provides returns to 
the wealthy.233 Increasing activity in the public markets is 
ultimately good for the public. However, because IPOs are 
costly endeavors, many companies are incentivized to remain 
 
229 See Brad Plumer, Tax Bill Largely Preserves Incentives for Wind and 
Solar Power, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 16, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/ 
2017/12/16/climate/tax-bill-wind-solar.html [https://perma.cc/X5T6-SEDN] 
(“For years, Congress has offered tax credits for wind and solar projects that 
can offset 30 percent or more of the total costs.”). 
230 This is based on the gross oversimplification that higher profits 
would yield higher taxable corporate income. But see Patricia Cohen, 
Profitable Companies, No Taxes: Here’s How They Did It, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 
9, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/09/business/economy/corporate-
tax-report.html [https://perma.cc/X8QA-9TQ6].  
231 See generally GRAETZ & SCHENK, supra note 228, at 497–504. 
232 See supra Section IV.B. 
233 See supra Section IV.B. 
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private. Tax credits could be a viable solution to help subsidize 
the costs of going public. Economically rational companies will 
ultimately decide for or against an IPO based on its potential 
financial impact. Tax credits can serve as a meaningful way 
to effectively reduce the costs of going public and, therefore, 
encourage more companies to choose the public markets over 
private. 
C. Eliminate the Confidential DRS Process for EGCs 
and Non-EGCs 
The confidential DRS process has yet to conclusively 
increase IPO activity. Companies themselves, not investors or 
the capital markets, are the only ones who benefit from the 
current policies enacted through the JOBS Act and the July 
2017 Change. Instead, the confidential DRS process actively 
inhibits IPO growth and has other negative consequences. 
Therefore, it should be ended for EGCs and non-EGCs alike, 
and the IPO process must return to the principles of public 
disclosure as originally intended by the 1933 Act. 
The first problem with the confidential DRS process is it 
inhibits companies from going public because they have 
“greater flexibility in timing their IPOs.”234 For example, prior 
to 2000, it typically took between forty-five and sixty days for 
a company to complete an IPO after initially filing its 
registration statement.235 However, from 2013–2016, it took 
EGCs a median of sixty-seven days from the initial 
confidential DRS filing to the filing of the Form S-1.236 Such 
companies then take additional time between the filing of the 
Form S-1 and the actual IPO date.237 Although this may 
suggest that the confidential DRS process merely adds an 
additional few months to the overall IPO timeline, in some 
cases, firms may wait years after filing a confidential DRS 
before going public.238 Thus, the ability to confidentially file a 
 
234 Marderosian, supra note 106. 
235 See id. 
236 Id. 
237 See supra notes 69–71 and accompanying text. 
238 See supra notes 169–70 and accompanying text. 
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DRS allows companies to remain private for much longer than 
companies did before the creation of the confidential DRS 
review process.  
A second problem with the confidential DRS process is that 
some evidence suggests it does not reduce costs associated 
with going public. For example, one study found that the 
JOBS Act did not reduce the direct costs of going public, and 
actually increased indirect costs—measured by 
underpricing239—by seventy-six percent.240 The study notes 
that these findings “are consistent with a large body of 
literature that finds that investors value transparency and 
that, in its absence, issuers are penalized by a higher cost of 
capital.”241 
Finally, the confidential DRS process has also resulted in 
unintended consequences that negatively affect individual 
investors. A study conducted by then-Professor Robert J. 
Jackson, Jr., a current SEC Commissioner, and others 
examined the confidential DRS process and several other 
aspects of the JOBS Act that reduce the level of required EGC 
disclosure.242 This study found that reducing mandatory 
 
239 Underpricing is “the fact that the price of the offered shares jumps 
substantially above the offering price during the first day of trading.” 
Berdejó, supra note 121, at 12. This is a problem for issuers because it 
means they leave “considerable amounts of money on the table” since the 
initial offer price was not set higher. Id. 
240 Susan Chaplinsky, Kathleen Weiss Hanley & S. Katie Moon, The 
JOBS Act and the Costs of Going Public, 55 J. ACCOUNTING RES. 795, 799 
(2017). 
241 Id. at 828. 
242 Honigsberg et al., supra note 115, at 313. Although the confidential 
DRS process results in issuers “eventually disclos[ing] the same amount of 
information” as issuers who opt to not use the confidential process, the 
authors of this study examined the confidential DRS process along with 
other JOBS Act provisions that more directly reduce EGC disclosure 
requirements, including the ability for EGCs to provide fewer than three 
years of audited financial statements and the ability for EGCs to opt out of 
SOX section 404(b). See id. The authors concluded that the confidential DRS 
benefit does directly affect the disclosure in the market because “it may 
severely limit the amount of time investors have to process the filings in 
question” due to the fact that a registration statement only needs to be filed 
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disclosure through the confidential DRS process and other 
provisions of the JOBS Act “led to a reduction in trading by 
individual investors, suggesting that individuals prefer to 
receive more information under these disclosures rather than 
less.”243 Within two weeks of a company’s IPO, however, these 
differences in individual investor activity had disappeared.244 
Nonetheless, the fact that the JOBS Act allows institutional 
investors to dominate the market for the first few weeks of an 
IPO is alarming, particularly because of the ability for early 
investors to capitalize on underpricing.245 The high returns 
that often accompany the first day of an IPO “are favorable for 
the initial IPO investors—who are able to purchase the IPO 
shares at the offering price and immediately resell them in the 
secondary market at a higher price[.]”246 The results of the 
Jackson et al. study suggest that individual investors are shut 
out from this opportunity, which is instead dominated by 
institutional investors, in part, because of the JOBS Act’s 
confidential DRS process. 
“Mandatory disclosure is the cornerstone of federal 
securities laws.”247 In general, disclosing issuer information is 
“socially desirable to the extent it bridges informational 
asymmetries between the issuer (and its insiders) and the 
market.”248 However, the confidential DRS process—created 
first by the JOBS Act and extended by the July 2017 
Change—delays disclosure requirements for issuers. Because 
this process does not bring about any meaningful net gain for 
society in terms of increased IPOs, but instead has produced 
several negative results, it should be abolished in favor of a 
return to complete investor transparency in accordance with 
the principals of the 1933 Act. 
 
fifteen days before the firm’s first road show. Id. at 313, 313 n.65; see also 
supra note 83 and accompanying text. 
243 Honigsberg et al., supra note 115, at 304. 
244 See id. at 304–05. 
245 See supra note 239. 
246 Berdejó, supra note 121, at 12. 
247 Honigsberg et al., supra note 115, at 295. 
248 Berdejó, supra note 121, at 17. 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
The SEC’s expansion of the confidential DRS process to 
non-EGCs through the July 2017 Change intended to increase 
the number of IPOs in the marketplace. However, the results 
of the empirical study conducted by the author of this Note 
indicate that the Change has not yet had any noticeable effect 
on IPO activity. It likely never will. Although non-EGCs offer 
value to the public markets due to the large amount of capital 
their IPOs raise, there simply are not enough firms of this size 
to cause a meaningful increase in IPO volume. Moreover, 
minor changes to the process of going public will simply not 
effectuate the increase in public companies the SEC seeks. If 
the SEC is serious about revitalizing the capital markets, the 
answer is not to expand the private markets, which largely 
operate out of the reach of securities disclosure laws. Instead, 
the agency must work with Congress to ensure that being a 
public company is not a burden, but instead is the best option 
for an American company in need of capital. 
